Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Considering Time Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in Revising the Uniform Commercial Code by Duncan, John C., Jr.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2000 | Issue 4 Article 2
11-1-2000
Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting
Locally: Considering Time Extension Principles of
the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods in Revising the
Uniform Commercial Code
John C. Duncan Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John C. Duncan Jr., Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Considering Time Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 1363 (2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2000/iss4/2
2DUN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00 1:32 PM 
 
1363 
Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting 
Locally: Considering Time Extension Principles of the 
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods in Revising the Uniform Commercial 
Code 
John C. Duncan, Jr.∗  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE................................................ 1365 
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE CISG AND SOME COMPARISONS 
WITH THE UCC ............................................................ 1370 
 A. Application of the CISG............................................ 1370 
 B. Comparing the CISG with the UCC.......................... 1372 
III. PARTIES’ RIGHTS IN ANTICIPATION OF BREACH UNDER 
THE UCC AND THE CISG ............................................. 1374 
 A. What Constitutes Breach?.......................................... 1375 
 1. Under the Restatement of Contracts.................... 1375 
 2. The Perfect Tender Rule Under the UCC............ 1377 
 3. “Fundamental” Breach Under the CISG.............. 1379 
 B. Fixing Additional Time: Nachfrist.................................1381 
 1. The Parties’ Dilemma in the CISG ...................... 1381 
 
 ∗ Visiting Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.A. with distinction 
DePauw University; M.A. and M.S. with honors University of Michigan; M.B.P.A. Southeast-
ern University; J.D. Yale University Law School; Ph.D. Stanford University. This article could 
not have been completed without the continuous support and helpful comments of my wife, 
Elizabeth Lunsford Duncan (B.A. Fisk University, J.D. Howard University Law School), and 
the intellectual legacy of my recently deceased mother Yvonne A. Duncan (B.S. West Virginia 
State University, M.C.Sc. Boston University). Most able research assistants and stellar proof-
reading were provided by Matthew Cordin, J.D. A good part of the work was completed while 
a visiting professor at Emory University Law School, where Professor Tibor Varady, L.L.M., 
S.J.D., graciously served as a reader. Utmost appreciation is extended to Professor Frank Elli-
ott, professor and former dean of Texas Wesleyan Law School, for his continuous encourage-
ment. The author teaches Contracts, Commercial Law, Administrative Law, Education Law, 
and International Law. 
2DUN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:32 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1364 
 2. The Nachfrist Procedure Under Articles 47  
and 63............................................................... 1383 
 a. Fixing Additional Time................................... 1383 
 b. Demanding Performance Within a Reasonable 
Amount of Time........................................... 1383 
 c. The Effect of Nachfrist After the Additional Pe-
riod Has Passed ............................................ 1385 
 3. Flexibility of the Nachfrist Procedure  
in the CISG ....................................................... 1386 
IV. CONSIDERATION OF INCLUDING NACHFRIST  
IN THE UCC ................................................................. 1390 
 A. Utility of Self-Help.................................................... 1391 
 B. The Incorporation Process: Rethinking Current Article 
2 Provisions ............................................................ 1394 
 1. The Standards for Breach in Article 2................... 1394 
 a. The Perfect Tender Rule................................. 1394 
 b. “Substantial Impairment” in Installment Con-
tracts ............................................................ 1395 
 2. Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance....... 1400 
 a. Problematic Language in § 2-609 ................... 1400 
 b. Interplay Between § 2-609 and § 2-612 ......... 1404 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR INCLUSION OF A NACHFRIST PROVISION 
IN THE UCC ................................................................. 1406 
 A. Raising the Threshold for Breach............................... 1407 
 B. Adopting Cooperative Provisions for Nachfrist and 
Adequate Assurance of Performance ........................ 1408 
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 1410 
2DUN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:32 PM 
1363] Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally 
 1365 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (“CISG” or “Convention”)1 came into exis-
tence in 1980 and “established the benchmark for the unification of 
commercial law in the post-war era.”2 It is generally recognized as 
the first sales law treaty to be accepted worldwide.3 The United 
States ratified the treaty on December 11, 1986.4 The CISG went 
into effect on January 1, 1988, among 11 nations.5 Fifty-seven na-
tions, including most of the major trading states, have ratified the 
Convention.6 V. Suzanne Cook notes, 
 
 1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 (1980), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
[hereinafter CISG]. 
 2. Harold S. Burman, Building on the CISG: International Commercial Law Develop-
ments and Trends for the 2000’s, 17 J.L. & COM. 355 (1998). Efforts to unify international 
commercial law date back to the 1930s, under the initiative of the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 4 (1999). 
 3. See JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 1 (1995); Larry 
A. DiMatteo, An International Contract Formula: The Informality of International Business 
Transactions Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Li-
ability, L=(ii)2, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 67, 68–69 (1997). For a summary by Pro-
fessor DiMatteo of the movement towards the international unification of contract law, see id. 
at 75–76. 
 4. See Burman, supra note 2, at 355. According to Burman, 
In the period from 1945 to 1970, cross-border harmonization of private law was 
primarily effective in the areas of international transportation and dispute resolution, 
the latter resulting in the Hague Conventions on service of process and evidence 
and the U.N. Convention . . . on foreign arbitral awards. The United States actively 
entered this process in the mid-1960’s, by joining the Hague Conference and 
UNIDROIT, becoming an active member of UNCITRAL which was established as 
a body of the U.N. General Assembly, and several years later becoming actively en-
gaged in the resurrected private international law (PIL) process at the Organization 
of American States. 
Id. 
 5. See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 2, at 4; see also Burman, supra note 2, at 355. 
 6. The number of countries adopting the CISG continues to increase. As of August 20, 
1999, the following countries are parties to the CISG: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, People’s Republic of 
China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yugosla-
via, and Zambia. For an updated list of Contracting States, visit <http://cisgw.law.pace.edu/ 
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In this time of unprecedented globalization of trade, the [CISG] 
responds to the need for a uniform sales law with international ap-
plication and acceptance. When law is at its best, it serves and mir-
rors the values of society and resolves conflicts in a manner that is 
consistent with such values and expectations. In the case of CISG, 
with application in [more than] fifty Contracting States spanning 
five continents and diverse legal systems and traditions, that is a 
formidable task.7 
As business interests in the United States continue to globalize, 
the importance of familiarity with provisions contained in the CISG 
will be of greater importance to domestic businesses.8 The ability of 
domestic businesses to engage in international commercial activity 
via electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) may also compound prob-
lems associated with international commercial disputes.9 Where the 
CISG is applicable,10 domestic businesses must confront the issue of 
whether the application of the CISG will result in unexpected or un-
anticipated liability.11 Even if the CISG is inapplicable (i.e., the CISG 
 
cisg/countries/cntries.html> (visited Nov. 18, 2000). On the expansion of the number of 
Contracting States, see MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS  AND CISG (1997); JAMES M. KLOTZ & JOHN A. BARRETT, INTERNATIONAL 
SALES AGREEMENTS: AN ANNOTATED DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING GUIDE 3 (Int’l ed. 
1998); V. Susanne Cook, CISG: From the Perspective of the Practitioner, 17 J.L. & COM. 343, 
343–44 (1998). 
 7. Cook, supra note 6, at 343–44 (footnotes omitted). 
 8. See DiMatteo, supra note 3, at 69. 
 9. Some common problems include those found in finding applicable domestic law to 
apply to a contract, such as characterization, gap, accumulation, and related problems. See Elbi 
Janse van Vuuren, Termination of International Commercial Contracts for Breach of Contract: 
The Provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 15 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. LAW 583 (1998). 
 10. Applicability of the CISG is discussed infra notes 26–44. 
 11. See DiMatteo, supra note 3, at 68. Professor DiMatteo discusses this issue with re-
spect to a U.S. business person possessing only a working knowledge of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, but this issue certainly could arise with a U.S. business person unaware of the 
applicability of the CISG. Another area of concern commented on by Professor DiMatteo is 
the “ongoing internationalization of contract law.” He notes, 
The acceptance of generally recognized contract principles, the trend towards eco-
nomic trade unions, the adoption of international conventions, and the growth of 
international customary law has lead to the convergence of national legal systems in 
the area of international contract law. In the long-term, this movement towards in-
ternational unification and harmonization is likely to reduce transaction costs relat-
ing to contract formation. In the short-term, however, it further complicates an al-
ready complex international legal regime. 
Id. 
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does not apply to a particular contract, or the parties exclude applica-
tion of the Convention), 12 determining which law to apply in the ab-
sence of a choice of law provision is often a complex problem.13 
Where a choice of law provision has been included, more potential 
problems arise, including that of bias on the part of a court applying 
its own national law.14 
Notwithstanding these various problems occurring in interna-
tional commercial activity, the CISG provides what its drafters in-
tended it to provide—uniform law “a bit” more accessible and pre-
dictable than what preceded it.15 One of the Convention’s more 
intriguing aspects is its partial amalgamation of common law and 
civil law principles into one body of law. The incorporation of con-
 
 12. Article 6 provides, “[P]arties may exclude the application of this Convention or, 
subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.” CISG, supra 
note 1, art. 6. 
 13. See van Vuuren, supra note 9, at 583; see also Michael Joachim Bonell, The 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Why? What? How?, 69 TUL. L. 
REV. 1121, 1123 (1995). 
 14. See van Vuuren, supra note 9, at 584. Professor van Vuuren comments, 
Most choice of law clauses provide for the application of the domestic law of a spe-
cific country to disputes arising from the contract. While domestic law is able to 
adequately govern and regulate domestic contracts, this is not always the case with 
contracts with an international [flavor]. International contracts introduce problems 
unique to their nature, such as the intricacies of goods and money crossing interna-
tional borders. These contracts also require parties and lawyers of different back-
grounds—be it common law, civil law, developed, or developing countries—to meet 
minds over involved issues and difficult concepts. 
Id. at 583 (footnotes omitted); see also H. Booysen, The International Sale of Goods, 17 S. AFR. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 71 (1991–1992); S. VIEJOBUENO, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES 
RELATING TO THE VALIDITY OF INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS, 26(2) CILSA 173 
(1993). 
 15. See John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action—Uniform International Words: 
Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 211–12 (1988); Camilla Baasch Andersen, Fur-
thering the Uniform Application of the CISG: Sources of Law on the Internet, 10 PACE INT’L L. 
REV. 403 (1998). Andersen notes, 
As those familiar with the CISG are well aware, the Convention is a uniform sales 
law. This goal of uniformity is presented in the preamble, where it is evident that the 
drafters intended the Convention to be an adoption of uniform rules governing con-
tracts for the international sale of goods in the interest of removing “legal barriers in 
international trade” and promoting “the development of international trade.” Uni-
formity applies throughout the Convention by way of Article 7(1), which states: “In 
the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international charac-
ter and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of 
good faith in international trade.” 
Andersen, supra, at 403–04 (citing CISG, supra note 1, at Preamble, art. 7) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
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flicting principles could have rendered the Convention unworkable, a 
quandary clearly contemplated by its drafters.16 Camilla Baasch An-
dersen observed, 
[U]niformity does not follow automatically from a proclamation of 
uniform rules. Uniformity is a difficult goal to achieve, as uniform 
words do not always ensure uniform results, especially where a 
Convention is in effect throughout countries with completely dif-
fering social, economic, and cultural backgrounds, and perhaps 
most significantly, different legal systems.17 
Professor John Honnold commented that a partial reason for the 
failure of the 1964 Sales Convention was the rejection by common 
law countries of the use of “untranslatable” civil law concepts.18 
Comparative law is not typically a strong focal point of discussion 
among American scholars.19 The endeavor of uniformity requires an 
avoidance of interpreting international text through the “lenses of 
domestic law.”20 
 
 
 
 
 16. See Andersen, supra note 15, at 403–04. Professor Honnold explained in 1988, just 
after the CISG went into effect, 
One may well conclude that this is the end of the story: As our sad-faced realists 
predicted, international unification is impossible. But before we despair, perhaps we 
should consider the alternatives: “conflicts” rules that are unclear and vary from fo-
rum to forum; national systems of substantive law expressed in doctrines and lan-
guages that, for many of us, are impenetrable. The relevant question is surely this: Is 
it possible to make law for international trade a bit more accessible and predictable? 
As the “Sea Bees” say, the impossible takes a little longer: For international sales, as 
we have seen, it took more than half a century. 
Honnold, supra note 15, at 207–08. Professor Honnold also reviewed the first 10 years of the 
Convention in 1998. See John Honnold, The Sales Convention: From Idea to Practice, 17 J.L. 
& COM. 181 (1998). 
 17. Andersen, supra note 15, at 404 (footnotes omitted). 
 18. John Honnold, The Sales Convention: Background, Status, Application, 8 J.L. & 
COM. 1, 3 (1988). 
 19. See, e.g., E. Allen Farnsworth, The Concept of “Good Faith” in American Law, Centro 
di studie ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero [Center for Comparative and Foreign Law 
Studies] No. 10 (Rome 1993) (visited Nov. 18, 2000) <http://www.cnr.it/CRDCS/ 
farnswrt.htm> (stating that “[c]omparative law has traditionally been the province of European 
scholars. We of the common law tradition have shown less proficiency at comparative law and 
have often depended on Europeans . . . for leadership”); Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Com-
parative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331 (1998). 
 20. Honnold, supra note 15, at 208. 
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Just as dangers—and corresponding antidotes21—exist in apply-
ing uniform international law, such a body of law also offers oppor-
tunities for insight into application and potential progress of existing 
domestic laws. A study of the CISG offers such opportunity for study 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC” or “Code”). While the 
UCC clearly is not a “code” in civil law vocabulary,22 several works 
have indicated that some of the UCC’s provisions were derived par-
tially from foreign influence, particularly from German sources.23 
The relative success of the CISG, coupled with globalization and 
other influences, has led a number of commentators to suggest in-
clusion of some foreign provisions found in the CISG into the UCC 
through revision.24 One particular focus of inclusion by these com-
mentators has centered on the concept of Nachfrist, generally mean-
ing “extension,” as it was adopted into the CISG from German civil 
law.25 
 
 21. Professor Honnold offers at least two antidotes to the problems of the “threat” to 
uniformity caused by viewing law through the lenses of domestic law. The first, he notes, is to 
look at the uniform law the way that lawyers from other jurisdictions have viewed the interna-
tional text. See id. A second antidote is to view the international legislative history of a particu-
lar enactment. See id. at 209. 
 22. See id. at 210. 
 23. See, e.g., James Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on 
Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987). 
 24. See Schadbach, supra note 19; GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE U.N. 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (Albert H. Kritzer 
ed., 1994); Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law Via 
Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 303 
(1996); John Honnold, The New Uniform Law for International Sales and the UCC: A Com-
parison, 18 INT’L LAW. 21 (1984); Richard D. Kearney, Current Development: Developments in 
Private International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 724 (1987); Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 281 (1994); Eric C. Schneider, The Seller’s Right to Cure Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 7 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 69 (1989). 
 25. The CISG Nachfrist provisions are found in Article 47 (available for buyer) and Ar-
ticle 63 (available for seller). CISG, supra note 1, arts. 47, 63; see also DiMatteo, supra note 3, 
at 77. Article 47 provides as follows: 
(1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for perform-
ance by the seller of his obligations. 
(2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not perform 
within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period, resort to any rem-
edy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is not deprived thereby of any right 
he may have to claim damages for delay in performance. 
CISG, supra note 1, art. 47. Article 63 provides a similar option for sellers. See CISG, supra 
note 1, art. 63; Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: 
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This article examines the Nachfrist concept as it applies to the 
CISG and considers its potential application to the UCC. Part II 
provides an overview of the applicability of the CISG to international 
sales contracts and compares some of the provisions in the Conven-
tion with those found in the UCC. Part III discusses the difference 
between what constitutes breach under the UCC and the CISG and 
explains when Nachfrist applies to CISG contracts. Part IV takes a 
closer look at the UCC, considering the need for adding a new pro-
vision such as Nachfrist and rethinking some of the current mechan-
ics in light of potential incorporation of the Nachfrist provision. Part 
V offers suggestions for inclusion of the Nachfrist procedure in light 
of the reconsideration of these existing provisions. 
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE CISG AND SOME COMPARISONS WITH 
THE UCC 
A. Application of the CISG 
For the CISG to apply to an international sale of goods, four im-
portant qualifications must be met. First, the parties whose places of 
business are in different nations must both be from different con-
tracting states.26 Second, although the CISG applies to the sale of 
goods, it does not apply to all sales of goods.27 Under Article 2 of 
the Convention, the CISG does not apply to the sale of consumer 
goods;28 sales by auction;29 sales on execution or otherwise by au-
 
The Perspective from Article 2 of the UCC, 8 J.L. & COM. 53, 70–75 (1988) (explaining the 
influence of the Nachfrist concept on the CISG); Schadbach, supra note 19, at 350 (asserting 
that the use of Nachfrist is illustrative of appropriate application of comparative law principles). 
 26. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 1; see also KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 3. Un-
der section (1)(b) of Article 1, the CISG also applies “when the rules of private international 
law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(b). 
However, Article 95 allows nations to declare a reservation so that (1)(b) of Article 1 does not 
apply. The United States chose this reservation. See KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 5. 
 27. See KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 6; see, e.g., Parties Unknown, Oberlandes-
gericht Koln, 19 U 282/93 (visited Nov. 18, 2000) <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/wais/db/cases2/941027a3.html>; Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 1994, 
970, Case 122, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), United Nations (visited Nov. 18, 
2000) <http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm> (explaining why an order for a “market 
analysis” was neither a sale of goods nor a contract for the production of goods). 
 28. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 2(a). These goods are defined as those “bought for per-
sonal, family or household use.” Id.; see also KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 6 (noting 
that “[t]his covers situations where individuals shop on the other side of a nearby international 
border, shop during trips abroad, or order from foreign order houses”); Michael Kabik, 
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thority of law;30 sales of stock, shares, investment securities, negotia-
ble instruments or money;31 sales of ships, vessels, hovercraft, or air-
craft;32 or sales of electricity.33 Third, the CISG does not apply where 
the buyer “undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials 
necessary for such manufacture or production.”34 Moreover, it does 
not apply where the “preponderant part of the obligations of a party 
who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of [labor] or other 
services.”35 Fourth, the CISG does not apply to several types of ques-
tions: the validity of the contract,36 the effect of property,37 and 
liability due to death or personal injury.38 
The CISG also contains an important provision in Article 6, 
whereby parties may “opt out” of the application of its provisions or 
derogate from or vary the effect of its provisions.39 Cook remarks, 
 
Through the Looking-Glass of International Trade in the “Wonderland” of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW 408 
(1992). 
 29. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 2(b). 
 30. See id. art. 2(c). 
 31. See id. art. 2(d). 
 32. See id. art. 2(e). 
 33. See id. art. 2(f). 
 34. Id. art. 3(1). Klotz notes that “[t]his provision applies generally to specialized situa-
tions, such as turnkey assembly operations, parent/subsidiary sales (where choice of law is usu-
ally not at issue), or specialized border issues, such as the Mexican maquiladora-type indus-
tries.” KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 7; see also Parties Unknown, Supreme Court of 
Austria, 8 Ob 509/93 (Oct. 27, 1994) (Germany) (visited Nov. 18, 2000) <http:// 
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/941027a3.html>. 
 35. CISG, supra note 1, art. 3(2); see also KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 7. 
 36. According to Klotz and Barrett, 
The CISG governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and ob-
ligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. It is not concerned 
with “the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage,” except 
as otherwise expressly provided in the CISG. This provision covers circumstances 
where, for example, domestic law prohibits the sale of specified products (for exam-
ple, contraband and controlled substances), where a person who is induced to enter 
a contract by fraud is given special rights and remedies under domestic law . . . to 
enter into a contract . . . or where issues of agency arise under domestic law. 
Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted); see also CISG, supra note 1, art. 4; Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, 
Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1993). 
 37. See KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 8; CISG, supra note 1, art. 4. 
 38. See KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 9; CISG, supra note 1, art. 5. 
 39. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. Derogating from or varying the effects of the CISG is 
subject to the provisions in Article 12, which states, 
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Much to its credit, [the] CISG is a flexible and modern sales law 
that promotes and respects the freedom of the parties to a sales 
contract to contractually deviate from its provisions, including the 
election to opt out of [the] CISG and choose the application of an 
entirely different body of law. Most U.S. practitioners confronted 
with the issue are delighted with this choice and generally elect, 
without any hesitation and little reflection, to apply the familiar and 
trusted UCC. While the lack of reflection may be misguided, the 
conclusion may well be appropriate in many instances.40 
Cook also comments that due to the opt-out provision, “most 
reported cases have arisen under [the] CISG merely because the par-
ties, or their counsel, failed to consider the application of [the] CISG 
and arrived at litigating under [the] CISG by default only.”41 An im-
portant consideration for drafters of international sales contracts is 
that, unlike some nations, the United States has adopted the CISG.42 
As a treaty ratified by the federal government, it “outranks” or 
“trumps” state statutes, such as the UCC.43 Nonetheless, only two 
cases interpreting the CISG have arisen in U.S. courts, due to the 
“apparent reluctance of the result-oriented international business 
community and international legal practitioners to embrace the Con-
vention because of the unpredictability of law in international sales 
transactions.”44 
B. Comparing the CISG with the UCC 
It seems natural for a U.S. attorney to compare the provisions of 
the CISG with the more familiar terms of the UCC to establish a 
 
Any provision of article 11, article 29, or Part II of this Convention that allows a 
contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, accep-
tance or other indication of intention to be made in any form other than in writing 
does not apply where any party has his place of business in a Contracting State 
which has made a declaration under article 96 of this Convention. 
Id. art. 12. 
 40. Cook, supra note 6, at 349 (citations omitted). 
 41. Id. at n.34. 
 42. See B. Blair Crawford, Drafting Considerations Under the 1980 United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 187, 193 (1988). 
 43. Id. 
 44. V. Susanne Cook, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods: A Mandate to Abandon Legal Ethnocentricity, 16 J.L. & COM. 257, 258 (1997). The 
two cases are Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) and Filanto, 
SpA v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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point of reference.45 One concern with this approach is that the 
UCC as adopted in each state varies slightly, so an attorney will have 
to recognize contrasting provisions between the state’s law and the 
uniform act, as well as recognize contrasts between the uniform act 
and the CISG.46 Klotz warns, “U.S. attorneys examining the CISG 
for the first time may be lulled by the apparent similarities between 
UCC Article 2 and the CISG. Although they appear very similar, 
there are some significant differences between the two.”47 Some of 
these differences include the following: (1) scope of applicability,48 
(2) Statute of Frauds,49 (3) contract formation (“battle of the  
forms”),50 (4) examination and notice,51 (5) claims for damages,52 
 
 45. See Cook, supra note 6, at 345. 
 46. See KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 9. 
 47. Id. 
 48. As noted above, the CISG only excludes certain types of goods from its scope. See 
supra notes 26–38 and accompanying text; see also KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 10. 
“Goods” are defined in the UCC as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid.” UCC § 2-
105. Under this broad definition, these goods are subject to the UCC, leading to a more in-
clusive application than the CISG. See KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 10. 
 49. Under the UCC, a contract for the sale of goods over $500 must be evidenced by a 
writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. UCC § 2-201(1). Under 
CISG, “[a] contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not sub-
ject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.” 
CISG, supra note 1, art. 11; see also KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 10–11; Cook, supra 
note 6, at 346. 
 50. Where a contract is formed by exchange of a form purporting to be an offer and a 
form containing additional or different terms as a purported acceptance, under both the UCC 
and the CISG a contract is formed but little guidance is offered on the appropriate terms of the 
agreement. See Cook, supra note 6, at 348. Under the UCC, such an acceptance is valid even 
though it states terms different than or in addition to terms found in the offer, “unless accep-
tance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.” UCC § 2-
207(1). By contrast, CISG follows the common law “mirror image” rule, under which the 
presence of different or additional terms means no acceptance occurred. CISG, supra note 1, 
art. 19(1). Instead, the purported acceptance acts as a rejection of an offer and constitutes a 
counter-offer. Id. CISG contains a provision, somewhat like the UCC, under which “a reply to 
an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additional or different terms which 
do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance,” unless the offeror ob-
jects without undue delay. Id. art 19(2). 
 51. The UCC requires notice from a buyer within a reasonable amount of time after 
discovery of a defect in the goods. UCC § 2-607(3)(a). The CISG requires that the buyer 
must notify the seller of a lack of conformity within a reasonable time after she has discovered 
or should have discovered it. CISG, supra note 1, art. 39(1). Unlike the UCC, however, the 
CISG provides that “the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he 
does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years from the date 
on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, unless this time-limit is inconsis-
tent with a contractual period of guarantee.” Id. art. 39(2). 
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(6) warranty disclaimers.53 
These differences illustrate some of the aspects of which practi-
tioners should be aware. The remainder of this article considers the 
different treatment of breach of contract in the UCC and the CISG 
to introduce the concept of Nachfrist in the CISG and international 
law. 
III. PARTIES’ RIGHTS IN ANTICIPATION OF BREACH UNDER THE 
UCC AND THE CISG 
When a party anticipates that the seller will breach the contract, 
provisions in the UCC and the CISG do not differ significantly.54 
Section 2-609 of the UCC allows one party to demand adequate as-
surance of due performance in the event that reasonable grounds for 
insecurity exist with respect to performance of the other party.55 
Likewise, under the CISG, “[a] party may suspend the performance 
of his obligations if, after the conclusion of the contract, it becomes 
apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of 
his obligations.”56 If the other party gives adequate assurance of per-
formance, the party suspending performance must continue per-
formance.57 The UCC and the CISG do, however, contain differ-
ences with respect to the parties’ rights in the event of a potential 
breach, and the CISG contains a provision (Nachfrist) allowing one 
party, under certain circumstances, to fix an additional period of time 
for the seller to perform his obligations.58 The significance of these 
provisions may be understood by recognizing the differences in what 
constitutes a breach under the UCC and the CISG. 
 
 52. Klotz explains, “[a]lthough both the CISG and UCC Article 2 allow recovery of 
foreseeable damages, the CISG includes damages which the party ‘ought to have foreseen,’ as 
well as those which were actually foreseen.” KLOTZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 13; see also 
CISG, supra note 1, art. 74. 
 53. Unlike the UCC, CISG does not adhere to any formal requirements to disclaim 
warranties, such as a “conspicuous” disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability that 
expressly mentions the term “merchantability.” UCC § 2-314; CISG, supra note 1, art. 35; see 
also Cook, supra note 6, at 346–47. 
 54. Parts IV and V, infra, however, explain that the provisions contained in the CISG 
dealing with prospective nonperformance would add significant options for aggrieved parties 
and should be considered for inclusion in the revised UCC Article 2. 
 55. See UCC § 2-609; see also GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 2, at 168–79. 
 56. CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1). 
 57. See id. art. 71(3). 
 58. See id. arts. 47, 63. 
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A. What Constitutes Breach? 
1. Under the Restatement of Contracts 
The Restatement of Contracts, Second, (“Restatement Second”) 
distinguishes between “partial” breach and “total” breach59 and 
makes an insignificant change from the common law concepts of 
“material” and “total” breach.60 John D. Calamari and Joseph M. 
Perillo summarize the effect of a “material” breach versus a “total” 
breach at common law as follows: 
If the breach is material, the aggrieved party may cancel the con-
tract. He may sue also for a total breach if he can show that he 
would have been ready, willing and able to perform but for the 
breach. However he also has the option of continuing with the 
contract and suing for a partial breach. If the breach is immaterial, 
the aggrieved party may not cancel the contract, but he may sue for 
a partial breach.61 
Under the Restatement Second, a “material” breach justifies the ag-
grieved party to suspend his performance.62 A “total” breach, alter-
natively, means that the breach justifies the aggrieved party cancel-
ling a contract and entitles him to a claim for damages for the 
remaining rights of performance.63 
Restatement Second lists five circumstances to consider in de-
termining whether a failure to perform is “material.” These include 
(1) the extent of the deprivation of a reasonably expected benefit to 
the aggrieved party; (2) the extent of the deprivation of adequate 
compensation for part of the benefit the aggrieved party will be de-
prived; (3) the extent of forfeiture suffered by the party failing to 
perform; (4) the likelihood the party failing to perform will cure his 
or her failure; and (5) the extent to which the party failing to per-
form does or does not comport with the requirement of good faith 
and fair dealing.64 Similarly, Restatement Second lists a series of cir-
 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236 (1979). 
 60. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 11-15, 11-18 (3d 
ed. 1987). 
 61. Id. § 11-18 (footnotes omitted). 
 62. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 236, 237, 241. 
 63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra 
note 60, § 11-18. 
 64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241. See also CALAMARI & 
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cumstances that determine whether there has been a “total” 
breach.65 
The so-called antithesis to a material breach is the doctrine of 
substantial performance, which arises in an exchange of performances 
in bilateral contracts.66 It is summarized by one court as follows: 
The substantial performance doctrine provides that where a con-
tract is made for an agreed exchange of two performances, one of 
which is to be rendered first, substantial performance rather than 
exact, strict or literal performance by the first party of the terms of 
the contract is adequate to entitle the party to recover on it.67 
 
 
PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-18, who list the following factors as significant with respect to 
whether a breach is material: 
1) to what extent, if any, the contract has been performed at the time of the breach. 
The earlier the breach the more likely it will be regarded as material. 2) A willful 
breach is more likely to be regarded as material than a breach caused by negligence 
or by fortuitous circumstances. 3) A quantitatively serious breach is more likely to be 
considered material. In addition, the consequences of the determination must be 
taken into account. The degree of hardship on the breaching party is an important 
consideration particularly when considered in conjunction with the extent to which 
the aggrieved party has or will receive a substantial benefit from the promised per-
formance and the adequacy with which he may be compensated for partial breach by 
damages. Materiality of breach is ordinarily a question of fact. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243, which states: 
§ 243. Effect of a Breach by Non-Performance as Giving Rise to a Claim for Dam-
ages for Total Breach 
 (1) With respect to performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, 
a breach by non-performance gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach only 
if it discharges the injured party’s remaining duties to render such performance, 
other than a duty to render an agreed equivalent under § 240. 
 (2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), a breach by non-performance accompanied 
or followed by a repudiation gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach. 
 (3) Where at the time of the breach the only remaining duties of performance are 
those of the party in breach and are for the payment of money in installments not 
related to one another, his breach by non-performance as to less than the whole, 
whether or not accompanied or followed by a repudiation, does not give rise to a 
claim for damages for total breach. 
 (4) In any case other than those stated in the preceding subsections, a breach by 
non-performance gives rise to a claim for total breach only if it so substantially im-
pairs the value of the contract to the injured party at the time of the breach that it is 
just in the circumstances to allow him to recover damages based on all his remaining 
rights to performance. 
 66. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-18(b). 
 67. Brown-Marx Assoc., Ltd., v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 703 F.2d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 
1983); see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-18(b). 
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Calamari and Perillo note that this doctrine has been applied 
with particular emphasis in construction contracts.68 Calamari and 
Perillo also note that “substantial performance is not full perform-
ance and that the party who relies on the doctrine has breached his 
contract. Consequently, he is liable in damages to the aggrieved 
party.”69 
2. The perfect tender rule under the UCC 
An exception to the doctrine of substantial performance occurs 
in a contract for the sale of goods.70 Calamari and Perillo comment, 
During the nineteenth century, the perfect tender rule developed 
with respect to contracts for the sale of goods. Under that rule the 
buyer was free to reject the goods unless the tender conformed in 
every respect to the contract. This includes not only quantity and 
quality but also the details of shipment. In the words of Learned 
Hand, “There is no room in commercial contracts for the doctrine 
of substantial performance.” The rule has been criticized and is par-
ticularly unfair when it is impractical for the seller to resell the re-
jected goods, for example, because the goods were specially manu-
factured. 71 
With the exception of installment contracts,72 the UCC contin-
ues to recognize the perfect tender rule noted above, both in Article 
2 and in Article 2A covering leases of goods.73 Under section 2-601, 
the buyer has the option of (a) rejecting the goods as a whole; (b) 
accepting the goods as a whole; or (c) “accept[ing] any commercial 
unit or units and reject[ing] the rest” “if the goods or the tender of 
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract.”74 Commenta-
tors have noted that the perfect tender rule has largely been criti-
 
 68. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-18(b). 
 69. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 70. See id. 
 71. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-20 (citing Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. J. 
Aron & Co., Inc., 16 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1926)). 
 72. See UCC § 2-612. The provisions in § 2-612 for installment contracts are consid-
ered in more detail infra, Part IV.B.1.b. 
 73. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-20. Article 2A’s provisions for de-
termining breach by a lessor are identical to that of Article 2. See UCC §§ 2A-509 (perfect 
tender rule); 2A-510 (breach of installment leases); 2A-523 (lessor’s rights in the event of les-
see’s breach). 
 74. UCC § 2-601 (emphasis added). 
2DUN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:32 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1378 
cized and has been in decline since even before the enactment of the 
UCC.75 It should also be noted that the perfect tender rule in the 
UCC is the only section applicable to one-shot contracts.76 
Even if the buyer rejects the contract, the buyer’s rejection under 
section 2-601 does not necessarily discharge the contract.77 In two 
specific situations, the UCC grants the seller a right to cure the non-
conformity in the goods or the tender of delivery.78 First, if the time 
for performance has not expired and the buyer rejects a tender or re-
jects goods for nonconformity, the seller retains an unconditional 
right to cure by making a conforming delivery within the time al-
lowed under the contract.79 Second, 
[w]hen the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender, the seller also 
has a right to cure after the time for performance has passed if (1) 
the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that the tender would 
be accepted “with or without money allowance;” (2) “the seller . . . 
seasonably notifies the buyer” of his intention to cure and cures the 
non-conforming tender within “a further reasonable time.”80 
It is particularly important to note that the termination of a contract 
under the perfect tender rule could result in serious consequences 
and excessive waste were it to apply in the international sales con-
text.81 For this reason, the CISG requires a “fundamental” breach to 
allow avoidance, as opposed to adopting the perfect tender rule 
found in U.S. commercial law. 
 
 75. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-20; JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3(b) (4th ed. 1995) (“We are skeptical of the 
real importance of the perfect tender rule. Even before enactment of the Code, the perfect 
tender rule was in decline, and the Code erodes the rule.” (footnotes omitted)); John Hon-
nold, Buyer’s Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 457 (1949). 
 76. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 8-3. 
 77. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-20(a). 
 78. See id. Calamari and Perillo note that, although the buyer loses the right to rejection 
if the cure takes place before rejection, the buyer retains a right to sue under UCC § 2-714. See 
id. § 11-20, n.8. 
 79. See id. § 11-20(a)(1); UCC § 2-508(1); Note, Uniform Commercial Code—Sales—
Sections 2-508 and 2-608—Limitations on the Perfect Tender Rule, 69 MICH. L. REV. 130 
(1970). 
 80. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 11-20(a)(2) (footnotes omitted); UCC § 
2-508(2). 
 81. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 70. 
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3. “Fundamental” breach under the CISG 
Under Article 25 of the CISG, 
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamen-
tal if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially 
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, 
unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person 
of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have fore-
seen such a result.82 
The decisive criterion in whether a breach is fundamental is 
whether the injury suffered by the aggrieved party is sufficiently sub-
stantial, determined in light of the circumstances in each case.83 Fac-
tors may include such considerations as “the monetary value of the 
contract, the monetary harm caused by the breach, or the extent to 
which the breach interferes with other activities of the injured 
party.”84 This injury must also be foreseeable. The party in breach 
may prove that she did not see and had no reason to foresee a par-
ticular result. 
The CISG requires the seller to deliver goods of the same quan-
tity, quality, and description as required by the contract but does not 
allow avoidance for mere noncompliance.85 Two key facets of the 
Convention distinguish the treatment of a breach in international 
contracts from the treatment under both the Restatement Second 
and the UCC. First, specific performance under civil law is generally 
considered the primary remedial measure in the event of a breach.86 
Clear examples can be found under Danish, German, Spanish, and 
French law, as well as the law of The Netherlands and the law of 
Louisiana, which has not adopted Article 2 of the UCC.87 Second, 
the Convention has adopted a policy to keep a contract intact, a pol-
 
 82. CISG, supra note 1, art. 25. 
 83. See Secretariat of the United Nations, Secretariat Commentary on Article 23 of the 
1978 Draft [draft counterpart to CISG Article 25] (visited Nov. 18, 2000) <http:// 
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-25.html>. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. art. 35. 
 86. See Robert B. von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations Be-
tween States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 
476, 499 (1981); DiMatteo, supra note 3, n.38; Jianming Shen, The Remedy of Requiring Per-
formance Under the CISG and the Relevance of Domestic Rules, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
253, 256, 280 (1996). 
 87. See Shen, supra note 86, at 280–82. 
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icy also adopted by the principles of the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”).88 Accordingly, 
avoidance of a contract under the CISG is an extraordinary (and 
powerful) remedy available to parties.89 
Like the UCC, if the seller delivers goods that are nonconform-
ing, the seller may cure the defect, provided this exercise does not 
cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable ex-
pense.90 In the event of a seller’s failure to perform any obligation, 
the buyer has two general options. First, she may exercise rights 
found in Articles 46 through 52, dealing with curing performance or 
avoiding the contract.91 Second, she may claim damages, as provided 
in Articles 74 through 77.92 With respect to the first option, the 
buyer may declare the contract avoided if the seller’s failure to per-
form any obligation amounts to a fundamental breach, as defined in 
Article 25, quoted above.93 The buyer may also avoid if, in the case 
of nondelivery of goods, the seller does not deliver the goods within 
an additional period of time fixed by the buyer, the Nachfrist no-
tice.94 
The seller’s right to avoid the contract is similar to that of the 
buyer’s. The seller may avoid the contract if a breach by the buyer is 
fundamental, even though the buyer may have taken possession of 
the goods.95 The seller may extend the additional period of time un-
 
 88. The policy of keeping a contract intact appears partially founded on the civil law 
approach to specific performance and partially on the nature of international contracts in gen-
eral, that is, negating the need for judicial intervention in the event of a breach. See Perillo, 
supra note 24, at 303. Professor Perillo explains, 
Like CISG, [the UNIDROIT Principles adopt] a policy of keeping the contract in-
tact if at all feasible. It does this by its emphasis on cure, adoption of the Nachfrist 
procedure, and by placing limitations on the power of an aggrieved party to cancel 
the contract because of breach by the other. The cure provisions are similar to Arti-
cles 37 and 48 of CISG. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF 
PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT), PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
(1994) [hereinafter Principles]. 
 89. See Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer on the United Nations Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: From the Perspective of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 279 (1997). 
 90. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 37. 
 91. See id. art. 45. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. art. 49; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 94. See id. arts. 46, 49. 
 95. See id. art. 64(1)(a); Gabriel, supra note 89, at 297. 
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der Article 63, during which the buyer must perform his obligations 
to pay the contract price or to take delivery of the goods.96 The seller 
may avoid if the buyer fails to pay the price or take delivery of the 
goods during the Nachfrist period.97 Article 64(1)(b) is limited to 
situations in which the Nachfrist notice fixed a period of time for the 
buyer to pay the price or to take delivery of the goods.98 
B. Fixing Additional Time: Nachfrist 
1. The parties’ dilemma in the CISG 
The preceding section sets forth two instances where avoidance is 
available to a party under the CISG—where a fundamental breach 
has occurred or where one party has failed to comply with the 
other’s Nachfrist notice. The requirement of fundamental breach 
causes a peculiar dilemma for the buyer in the case of delay by the 
seller. Should the buyer wait for performance until the point that the 
breach by the seller has become fundamental? If the buyer does wait 
until the breach has become fundamental, has the buyer failed to 
mitigate damages caused by the delay, as is required in Article 77?99 
Since reasonable minds will often differ as to whether the threshold 
for fundamental breach has occurred, the Nachfrist notice is a pow-
erful option available to a party anticipating breach. An example will 
illustrate the dilemma caused by the requirement of fundamental 
breach and illustrate, in part, the power of the Nachfrist notice in a 
contract governed by the Convention:100 
 
 96. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 63, 64(1)(b); Gabriel, supra note 89, at 297. 
 97. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 64(1)(b); Gabriel, supra note 89, at 297. 
 98. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 64(1)(b); Gabriel, supra note 89, at 297. Article 49, 
which permits avoidance for the buyer, is similarly limited to cases of nondelivery by the seller. 
CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(b). 
 99. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 77. 
 100. Both the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles contain Nachfrist provisions that are 
almost identical, although the provision contained in the Principles appears more detailed tex-
tually. See Principles, supra, note 88, art. 7.1.5; Perillo, supra note 24, at 303–04. Article 7.1.5 
of the Principles provides as follows: 
(1) In a case of non-performance the aggrieved party may by notice to the other 
party allow an additional period of time for performance. 
(2) During the additional period the aggrieved party may withhold performance of 
its own reciprocal obligations and may claim damages but may not resort to any 
other remedy. If it receives notice from the other party that the latter will not per-
form within that period, or if upon expiry of that period due performance has not 
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Experimental Transportation, Inc., of Los Angeles designed an all-
terrain vehicle for rugged hill country travel (called the “Clod 
Jumper”) and agreed to sell one for $30,000 to Dingo Ranch of 
Australia. Neither party was willing to be bound by the laws of the 
other’s country, so they agreed to adopt the law of the CISG. Ex-
perimental Transportation was supposed to deliver the Clod 
Jumper by December 1, but it had problems with Customs and 
that date came and went with no activity. Dingo Ranch sent a letter 
to Experimental Transportation proposing that the date of delivery 
be moved to February 1.101 
Though this example is relatively straightforward, it illustrates 
the basic concern for including such a notice in a contract governed 
by the CISG. A delay due to a problem caused with customs is not 
likely a fundamental breach. In the absence of fundamental breach, 
Dingo Ranch has some options but cannot avoid the contract with-
out using the Nachfrist notice.102 Moreover, each of Dingo’s poten-
tial options are fraught with uncertainty. Article 71, which permits a 
party to suspend performance, is applicable only where the suspen-
sion was caused by either “a serious deficiency in his ability to per-
form or in his creditworthiness,” or a party’s “conduct in preparing 
to perform or in performing the contract.”103 Even if this were appli-
cable to the example above, the seller would still have the right to 
provide adequate assurance of his performance.104 Other provisions 
 
been made, the aggrieved party may resort to any of the remedies that may be avail-
able under this Chapter. 
(3) Where in a case of delay in performance which is not fundamental the aggrieved 
party has given notice allowing an additional period of time of reasonable length, it 
may terminate the contract at the end of the period. If the additional period allowed 
is not of reasonable length it shall be extended to a reasonable length. The aggrieved 
party may in its notice provide that if the other party fails to perform within the pe-
riod allowed by the notice the contract shall automatically terminate. 
(4) Paragraph (3) does not apply where the obligation which has not been per-
formed is only a minor part of the contractual obligation of the non-performing 
party. 
 101. This example was provided in DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 
ON COMMERCIAL LAW 276 (3d ed. 1993). Professor Whaley’s questions directed at students 
have been omitted. 
 102. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 49. 
 103. Id. art. 71(1)(a), (b). 
 104. See id. art. 71(3). Under the UCC, Dingo’s options would likewise be limited to 
seeking adequate assurance of performance under section 2-609, assuming Dingo would not 
seek to terminate the contract due to repudiation by Experimental Transportation. See UCC § 
2-610. Unlike the CISG, Dingo would have no need for concern over whether Experimental 
Transportation’s delay amounted to a breach, since the perfect tender rule, described in Part 
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of Chapter 5 of the Convention are limited to instances where the 
breach has become fundamental.105 The Nachfrist option not only 
adds a considerable amount of certainty for Dingo Ranch as to the 
performance by the other party but also serves as a self-help remedy 
by obviating judicial intervention.106 
2. The Nachfrist procedure under Articles 47 and 63 
a. Fixing additional time. Both the buyer and the seller may fix 
additional time for the other party to perform obligations, irrespec-
tive of whether the obligation is basic or ancillary.107 For the buyer, 
the additional period may be applied for the seller to deliver, supply 
substitute goods in the case of nonconformity with the contract,108 
repair nonconforming goods,109 deliver necessary documents,110 or 
perform other acts in the contract, such as assembly of the goods.111 
For the seller, the additional period may be applied for the buyer to 
perform acts required to enable the seller to make the delivery,112 to 
take over the goods,113 or to pay the price for the goods.114 
b. Demanding performance within a reasonable period of time. 
When the buyer or seller fixes the additional period, the party fixing 
 
III.A.2, supra, would apply to this transaction. Were this contract an installment contract, on 
the other hand, the threshold for breach would be higher (i.e., the delay substantially impaired 
either the installment or the whole contract), then Dingo’s concerns about the standard for 
breach would be similar to that in this example. See UCC § 2-612. Parts IV and V, infra, sug-
gest that substantial impairment should be the standard for all breaches in the UCC and that 
Nachfrist should be a procedure available to aggrieved parties in the event of delay in delivery 
or payment. 
 105. See, e.g., id. arts. 72 (allowing a party to avoid a contract if “it is clear” that one 
party will commit a fundamental breach), 75 (permitting cover damages where the contract is 
avoided), 76 (permitting expectation damages where the contract is avoided). 
 106. See infra notes 156–70 and accompanying text, commenting about the use of 
Nachfrist in the UCC as a self-help provision. 
 107. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 395 (Geoffrey Thomas, trans., Clarendon Press 2d 
ed., 1998).  
 108. See id. art. 46(2). 
 109. See id. art. 46(3). 
 110. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 107, at 395. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 60(a). 
 113. See id. art. 60(b). 
 114. It seems more likely that nonpayment by a buyer would amount to a fundamental 
breach than would, for example, cause a delay in delivery by the seller. See SCHLECHTRIEM, 
supra note 107, at 486. 
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the period must stipulate performance by a particular date.115 A mere 
demand for performance, by itself, is not sufficient.116 However, 
when the party fixes additional time, a demand for performance must 
be made.117 For example, in the case of delay in delivery by the seller, 
the buyer may state to the seller, “you have until May 1 to deliver 
the goods.”118 Precatory language, such as “I hope delivery will be 
made by May 1,” is not a sufficient demand. On the other hand, it is 
not necessary that the party demanding performance threaten to re-
fuse to accept performance after the time fixed for performance.119 
The time for performance must be a reasonable period of time. 
What is reasonable depends largely on the circumstances. Professor 
Peter Schlechtriem comments that the following matters should be 
taken into account to determine whether the length of time is rea-
sonable:120 
[1] [L]ength of time of the contractual delivery period (transac-
tions with short delivery dates justify a shorter additional period, 
long delivery dates require a longer additional period); [2] the 
buyer’s recognizable interest in rapid delivery, if the seller should 
have been aware of that interest upon conclusion of the contract; 
[3] the nature of the seller’s obligation (a longer period is reason-
able for delivery of complicated apparatus and machinery of the 
seller’s own manufacture than for delivery of fungible goods by a 
wholesaler); [4] the nature of the impediment to delivery (if the 
seller is affected by a fire or strike, the buyer can be expected to 
wait for a certain time if the delivery is not particularly urgent).121 
 
 115. See id. at 395. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. at 396. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. The comments by Professor Schlechtriem were focused on buyers’ rights in Article 
47, although similar considerations would be applicable for sellers under Article 63. 
 121. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 107, at 396 (citations omitted). Professor Schlechtriem 
continues, 
In critical cases, the most important factor will be whether the buyer’s interest in 
rapid delivery was apparent upon the conclusion of the contract. If the buyer re-
quires particularly rapid delivery and the seller could not have been aware of that fact 
when concluding the contract, it cannot be taken into account. . . . If an additional 
period of time is fixed for delivery, regard must be had to the fact that the period is 
‘additional’ to the originally agreed delivery period. The seller is not entitled to be 
treated as if the contract has just been concluded. It is therefore not intended that, 
where delivery requires a lengthy preparatory period, the seller should be given an 
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Professor Schlechtriem comments that in a situation in which a 
party has fixed a period of time that is too short a distinction must be 
made with respect to its effects.122 If the party who fixed the time 
seeks to declare the contract avoided after the unreasonably short 
length, she may only do so if a fundamental breach has occurred. In 
this situation, the party’s “over-hasty declaration of avoidance” con-
stitutes a breach of contract.123 On the other hand, if the party fixing 
additional time does not declare the contract avoided immediately, 
but rather waits until after a reasonable period has passed, then Pro-
fessor Schlechtriem notes the party should have the right to declare 
the contract avoided.124 Where a period of time has been fixed that is 
longer than a reasonable time, the party fixing the additional time 
nevertheless is bound by the time fixed.125 
c. The effect of Nachfrist after the additional period has passed. 
When a party fixes an additional period of time, the party may not 
resort to any other remedy until the period has passed, even if 
nonperformance by the other party otherwise constitutes 
fundamental breach.126 The party who fixed the time is precluded 
not only from avoiding the contract but also from resorting to such 
remedies as demanding a price reduction,127 recovering costs for 
curing defects,128 demanding delivery of substitute goods,129 or 
demanding that the other party perform under the contract.130 
When a party has used the Nachfrist procedure, she may resort to 
a remedy in two situations. First, the day the Nachfrist period ex-
pires, the other party must have performed or the aggrieved party 
may resort to a remedy. Second, if the party who must perform re-
fuses to perform and notifies the aggrieved party, then the aggrieved 
 
additional period for delivery of the same length as the original period, when he has 
not even begun those preparations at the beginning of that additional period. 
Id. at 396–97.  
 122. See id. at 397. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 47(2), 63(2); SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 107, at 
399. 
 127. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 50. 
 128. See id. art. 45(1)(b). 
 129. See id. art. 46(2). 
 130. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 107, at 399. 
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party need not wait until the Nachfrist period has expired.131 In ei-
ther situation, the aggrieved party gains a right to avoid the contract, 
a right to claim damages,132 and other rights provided in the Con-
vention. 
3. Flexibility of the Nachfrist procedure in the CISG 
The Clod Jumper example given above illustrates that the Nach-
frist option is a right of an aggrieved party, rather than an option to 
create a supplemental agreement. The provisions in Articles 47 and 
63 permit flexibility for parties to a contract and facilitate reasonable 
performance. The Nachfrist provisions in both the CISG and the 
UNIDROIT Principles differ somewhat from the provisions in the 
German Civil Code (“Burgerliches Gestzbuch” or “BGB”),133 upon 
which the provisions in the Convention and the Principles is partially 
based.134 Under German law,135 
 
 131. See id. 
 132. Under Article 47(2) and 63(2), the aggrieved party is not deprived of the right to 
claim damages caused by the delay in performance, even if additional time is extended through 
the Nachfrist procedure. 
 133. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) [BGB] § 326(1) (Otto Palandt ed. 44th ed. 
1985); see also van Vuuren, supra note 9, at 613 nn. 169–75. The United Nations Secretariat 
commentary to Article 47 and 63 indicate that both have a “certain parentage in the German 
procedure of Nachfrist and the French procedure of mise en demeure,” although neither Article 
47 nor 63 partakes of either the German or French counterpart.  Secretariat of the United Na-
tions, Secretariat Commentary on Article 43 of the 1978 Draft [draft counterpart of CISG Arti-
cle 47] (visited Nov. 18, 2000) <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-
47.html> [hereinafter Secretariat’s Commentary to Article 47]; Secretariat of the United Na-
tions, Secretariat Commentary on Article 59 of the 1978 Draft [draft counterpart of CISG Arti-
cle 63] (visited Nov. 18, 2000) <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-
63.html> [hereinafter Secretariat’s Commentary to Article 63]. 
 134. See RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS 
ENVIRONMENT 111 (2d ed. 1993) (“[C]ivil-law systems traditionally grant an additional pe-
riod of time, beyond the date called for in the contract, within which the parties may perform.”); 
DiMatteo, supra note 3, at 77 n.46; van Vuuren, supra note 9, at 613, 630. 
 135. The differences between the German philosophy of commercial law and that found 
in either the Anglo-American system or the CISG are somewhat beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion. Maryellen DiPalma comments, 
German contract law is grounded in an environment of flexibility and legal informal-
ism which differs greatly from Anglo-American jurisprudence. Contracting parties 
are given free reign under the [BGB] . . . in structuring their contractual relation-
ships. This permits parties greater latitude in structuring transactions using more 
numerous legal instruments to effectuate their intent. The German approach to con-
tractual liability is also more consequence-based than that of the common law sys-
tem. German law places less emphasis on types of legal instruments used and the la-
bels applied to them as well as on the legal meaning of the words used within the 
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Where delay per se would not frustrate the purpose of the contract, 
i.e. where time is not of the essence, the obligee must fix a reason-
able period of grace (Nachfrist) for the obligor before resorting to 
either remedy. The period of grace must be long enough to allow 
an obligor, who has already taken the necessary preparatory steps, 
to perform the contract within this time. The obligee must make it 
clear in his notice that after the period of grace he will refuse to ac-
cept any performance. If the obligee has given notice and the obli-
gor has not performed within the period of grace, the obligee may 
no longer claim performance. The contract can now only be wound 
up, either by a claim for damages for non-performance, or by a 
claim for rescission. A claim for specific performance is expressly 
prohibited by § 326(1) [of the BGB] and the options available to 
the aggrieved party are thereby limited. The obligee is not required 
at this stage to indicate whether he will rescind and claim restitu-
tion or claim damages, but he has to stay with the choice once it is 
unequivocally made. The choice is exercised . . . without undue de-
lay, otherwise the aggrieved party may lose his right to rescind. It is 
generally more favourable to claim damages.136 
Like German law, the party giving the Nachfrist notice under the 
CISG (as well as the UNIDROIT Principles) may not resort to any 
other remedy during the stated period, with the exception of the 
right to claim damages for the delay.137 After the stated period, the 
 
instruments. German commercial law attempts, instead, to give greater effect to the 
implicit purpose of the instruments. 
Maryellen DiPalma, Nachfrist Under National Law, the CISG, and the UNIDROIT and Euro-
pean Principles: A Comparison, 5 INT’L CONTRACT ADVISOR 28 (Winter 1999) (visited Nov. 
18, 2000) <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/DiPalma.html>; see also Larry A. Di-
Matteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended Contractual Liability in 
International Business Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 123–24 (1997). 
 136. van Vuuren, supra note 9, at 613–14 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also 
GERHARD DANNEMANN, AN INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW 29 
(1993); NIGEL G. FOSTER, GERMAN LAW & LEGAL SYSTEM 217 (1993); NORBERT HORN ET 
AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 104 (Tony Wier trans., 1982); Ludwig 
Linder, Law of Contracts, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY 10-1, § 10.04(4) (Dennis 
Campbell et al. eds., 2000). DiPalma offers the following loose translation of section 326 of 
the BGB: 
The Creditor must, as a general rule, reasonably extend the original term for per-
formance unless such contractual performance is of no further interest to the Credi-
tor due to the delay or unless the final deadline is apparently, for some other reason, 
superfluous. When the grace period has elapsed without completion of the contrac-
tual obligation, the Creditor must choose between damages for non-performance 
and avoidance of the contract. A claim for performance is, however, excluded. 
DiPalma, supra note 136 (see section titled “Nachfrist under German Law”). 
 137. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 47(2), 63(2); Principles, supra note 88, art. 7.1.5(2). 
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aggrieved party may avoid the contract138 or may bring a claim for 
specific performance.139 The latter option is contrary to German law, 
which expressly prohibits an action for specific performance after the 
Nachfrist period has expired.140 Both the CISG and the Principles 
also grant the aggrieved party the right (or option)141 to use the 
Nachfrist procedure even if nonperformance rises to a level of a fun-
damental breach.142 Where CISG applies (or where the UNIDROIT 
Principles are considered), aggrieved parties have available to them 
more options and may proceed—in many cases extrajudicially—with 
greater certainty than would be available without the Nachfrist pro-
cedure or even with the procedure found in German law.143 
The drafters of both the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG 
recognized that late performance differs significantly from other 
forms of defective performance.144 According to the official com-
ments to the UNIDROIT Principles, 
Late performance can never be remedied since once the date for 
performance has passed it will not occur again, but nevertheless in 
 
 138. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 49, 64. 
 139. DiPalma comments, 
In German case law, a notice period of additional time that is too short will be 
enlarged de jure to a reasonable period of time unless the buyer, by the shortness of 
the stipulated period, demonstrates an intention to effectively provide no additional 
period. That extension of time is automatic, unlike similar notices under common 
law where a fresh notice may have to be served since a judicially-invalidated notice 
will be treated as having no effect. Under German law, if the buyer requests a Nach-
frist, the seller is obligated to respond to the request. Failure to do so results in an 
automatic grant of additional time. 
DiPalma, supra note 135 (see section titled “Nachfrist Under German Law”). 
 140. See BGB, supra note 133, § 326(1); see also Schadbach, supra note 19, at 350; van 
Vuuren, supra note 9, at 630. Schadbach comments, “[Under the German law, after] the grace 
period has elapsed without the performance, the claimant can choose between the remedies of 
damages for non-performance and avoidance of the contract. A claim for performance, how-
ever, is excluded.” Schadbach, supra note 19, at 350. 
 141. The language used in Articles 47(1) and 49(1) (in the case of a buyer) and Articles 
63(1) and 64(1) clearly suggests Nachfrist is an option in addressing the aggrieved parties 
rights in the event of nonperformance. 
 142. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 47, 63; Principles, supra note 88, art. 7.1.5 and com-
ment; van Vuuren, supra note 9, at 630. 
 143. See van Vuuren, supra note 9, at 630. 
 144. See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Official Comments on 
Article of the UNIDROIT Principles (visited Nov. 18, 2000) <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/principles/uni47.html> [hereinafter Official UNIDROIT Comments]; Secretariat’s 
Commentary to Article 47, supra note 133, cmt. 2; Secretariat’s Commentary to Article 63, 
supra note 133, cmt. 2. 
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many cases the party who is entitled to performance will much pre-
fer even a late performance to non performance at all. Secondly, at 
the moment when a party fails to perform on time it is often un-
clear how late performance will in fact be. The commercial interest 
of the party receiving performance may often therefore be that a 
reasonably speedy completion, although late, will be perfectly ac-
ceptable but that a long delayed completion will not. The [Nach-
frist] procedure enables that party to give the performing party a 
second chance without prejudicing its other remedies.145 
Rather than requiring one party to seek from the other adequate 
assurances of performance, granting additional time may solve many 
instances of delay. For example,146 assume A agrees to sell a special 
automobile to B. The contract provides that the automobile will be 
ready by July 1. On June 30, B needs the automobile, but A has not 
quite finished. A assures B that the car will be completed in one 
week. Though it is apparent that A will not perform a substantial 
part of his obligations,147 B may not desire to suspend his own obli-
gations and demand adequate assurance from A (assuming the delay 
does not amount to a fundamental breach under the CISG, which 
would permit avoidance).148 Rather, B may grant the additional week 
 
 145. Official UNIDROIT Comments, supra note 144, art. 7.1.5 cmt. 1. The United Na-
tions Secretariat’s commentary to Articles 47 and 63 also indicate that cases of delay should be 
treated differently than those of defective performance. With respect to Article 47’s Nachfrist 
procedure for aggrieved buyers, the commentary suggests, 
If the seller delays performing the contract, the judicial procedure for enforcement 
may require more time than the buyer can afford to wait. It may consequently be to 
the buyer’s advantage to avoid the contract and make a substitute purchase from a 
different supplier. However, it may not be certain that the seller’s delay constitutes a 
fundamental breach of contract justifying avoidance of the contract under Article 
[49(1)(a)]. . . . This Convention specifically rejects the idea that in a commercial 
contract for the international sale of goods the buyer may, as a general rule, avoid 
the contract merely because the contract delivery date has passed and the seller has 
not yet delivered the goods. In these circumstances the buyer may do so if, and only 
if, the failure of delivery on the contract delivery date causes him substantial detri-
ment and the seller foresaw or had reason to foresee such a result. 
Secretariat’s Commentary to Article 47, supra note 133, cmts. 2 and 4. The commentary to 
the seller’s right to avoid for mere nonpayment on the date of the buyer’s performance is al-
most identical. See Secretariat’s Commentary to Article 63, supra note 134, cmts. 2 and 4. 
 146. This example is based on one provided in the official comments to the UNIDROIT 
Principles. See Official UNIDROIT Comments, supra note 144,  art. 7.1.5 ill. 1. 
 147. Under the terminology of section 2-609, A would have “reasonable grounds for 
insecurity.” UCC § 2-609(2). 
 148. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 25, 71(1), (3). 
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and continue performance.149 The option open to B—to choose not to 
suspend his own performance by granting a reasonable extension—is 
the essential difference between a party’s rights under the Conven-
tion and the Code in a situation involving a delay in performance.150 
This option, this Article suggests in the following two sections, 
should be included in the revised UCC. 
IV. CONSIDERATION OF INCLUDING NACHFRIST IN THE UCC 
The concept of the Nachfrist procedure is not complicated, but 
it is powerful for buyers and sellers in contracts governed by the 
CISG. At present, however, it likely has limited practical application 
for most U.S. companies, since most opt out of the CISG when 
drafting their international contracts. This occurs even though Arti-
cle 6 permits parties to accept some provisions in the Convention 
and derogate from or vary the effect of other provisions.151 More-
 
 149. The issue of what constitutes sufficient notice may be explained with an example 
provided by Professor Honnold: 
A contract called for Seller to manufacture and deliver a complex stamping machine 
to Buyer by June 1. Seller was late in making delivery and on June 2 Buyer wired 
Seller: “We are anxious to receive machine. Hope very much that it can arrive by 
July 1.” Seller delivered the machine on July 3, but Buyer refused the machine and 
declared that the contract was avoided for failure to comply with the July 1 delivery 
date set forth in its wire of June 2. . . . 
. . . Such a notice gives no warning that a deadline has been “fixed.” Indeed, a 
communication that invites performance without making clear that a final deadline 
has been set could mislead the seller into an attempt at substantial performance. An 
effective notice under Article 47(1) should make clear that the additional period sets 
a fixed and final limit on the date for delivery . . . . 
JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION 369–70 (2d. ed. 1991); see also Secretariat’s Commentary to Article 
47, supra note 134, cmt. 7 (“the period may be fixed either by specifying the date by which 
performance must be made . . . or by specifying a time period. . . . A general demand by the 
buyer that the seller perform or that he perform ‘promptly’ or the like is not a ‘fixing’ of a pe-
riod of time under [Article 47]”); Secretariat’s Commentary to Article 63, supra note 134, 
cmt. 7 (same); DiPalma, supra note 135 (see heading titled “Nachfrist Under CISG”). The 
Official Comments to the UNIDROIT Principles offers a similar illustration to that of Profes-
sor Honnold’s. See Official Comments to UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 144, art. 7.1.5 ill. 
2 (Nachfrist notice of one month insufficient where performance will clearly take three 
months). 
 150. This does not ignore the provision in § 2-610, permitting an aggrieved party to 
await performance from a repudiating party for a commercially reasonable time. UCC § 2-
610(1). Where a Nachfrist provision differs from this option, the aggrieved party may fix the 
additional time, knowing that performance will be due at the conclusion of this period, rather 
than wait for performance when the other party repudiates the contract. 
 151. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. 
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over, the CISG’s Nachfrist procedure does not seem to suit the cur-
rent version of the UCC. The two primary factors in requiring ex-
tended time—the presumption of specific performance and the need 
for a fundamental breach—are absent from the UCC. Nonetheless, 
the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles have demonstrated that 
the application of the Nachfrist procedure can effectively facilitate 
the performance of a contract where one party has delayed perform-
ance. Potential inclusion of the Nachfrist doctrine has been discussed 
by several commentators152 and is discussed here. 
The process of incorporating Nachfrist requires a rethinking of 
some of the mechanics in the current version of the UCC. This proc-
ess also requires a reasoned justification for inclusion. Perhaps the 
most reasonable justification would be the potential of the Nachfrist 
procedure as a method of self-help in Article 2.153 If inclusion is justi-
fied on this ground, then the provisions requiring revision in the 
current version of the Code may be considered. This section first dis-
cusses the utility of implementing a self-help provision such as Nach-
frist into Article 2, explores the problems of incorporation in the cur-
rent version, and shows how the Nachfrist procedure could aid the 
treatment of a delay in performance. 
A. Utility of Self-Help 
Self-help provisions are often thought to be solutions to the 
overly litigious nature of Americans.154 Among the policies of the 
UCC are the goals “to simplify, clarify and modernize the law gov-
erning commercial transactions,”155 and “to permit the continued 
 
 152. See supra note 24. 
 153. The views considered primarily are those of E. Allen Farnsworth, E. ALLEN 
FARNSWORTH, 2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 8.19a (2d ed. 1998), and Celia R. Taylor, 
Self-Help in Contract Law: An Exploration and Proposal, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839 
(1998). 
 154. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 841. Professor Taylor explains, 
What this view [that Americans are too litigious] ignores, however, is that many dis-
putes never reach the courthouse. In a wide spectrum of controversies, a typical re-
action to trouble is to attempt to remedy the situation privately through the exercise 
of “self-help.” The term “self-help” refers to private actions taken by those inter-
ested in the controversy to prevent or resolve disputes without official assistance of a 
governmental official or disinterested third party. The misperception of the unduly 
litigious nature of Americans could be minimized if more explicit recognition were 
given to self-help, a practice already prevalent in our law. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 155. UCC § 1-102(2)(a). 
2DUN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:32 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1392 
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and 
agreement of the parties.”156 Examples outside of Article 2 include 
the secured party’s right under Article 9 to take possession of collat-
eral after the debtor defaults157 and the drawer’s right to stop pay-
ment on a check.158 Professor Farnsworth comments, however, that 
self-help can have a broader meaning: 
The term [self-help] is, however, sometimes used in a wider sense 
[than the procedures in Articles 4 and 9] to comprise a variety of 
steps not involving judicial intervention that a party can take to 
protect its interests after the contract has been made. A realization 
of the potential benefits in reducing the burdens on courts as well 
as in mitigating the hardships on the aggrieved party has probably 
contributed to their increased availability in recent decades, particu-
larly since the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code.159 
A major consideration in determining whether a self-help remedy 
should be included is the benefits on the parties who will use the 
remedy.160 Professor Celia Taylor observes, 
Parties frequently choose self-help remedies. This suggests that 
there are real or perceived benefits in self-help that motivate parties 
to elect it. One major factor enhancing the likelihood that a party 
will engage in self-help is the immediacy of the action. Parties can 
act quickly in response to problems if they can avoid seeking judi-
cial remedy or other third-party intervention, both of which typi-
cally involve delay. . . . This avoids delays in dealing with the 
goods, which could frustrate a seller’s interests and cause real psy-
chological harm. Moreover, self-help action is more certain in its 
immediate result. A party waiting for judicial determination of 
rights and obligations may not be able to take protective action 
prior to decision since the outcome of the judicial process is uncer-
tain. Although a party may have to pay for its decision to exercise  
 
 
 
 156. UCC § 1-102(2)(b). 
 157. See UCC § 9-503; FARNSWORTH, supra note 153, § 8.19a. 
 158. See UCC § 4-403; FARNSWORTH, supra note 153, § 8.19a. 
 159. FARNSWORTH, supra note 153, § 8.19a (footnotes omitted). 
 160. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 847. Professor Taylor provides a rather comprehen-
sive analysis of self-help in general, concluding that Nachfrist should be a self-help provision 
included in the revised UCC See id. at 901. This Article does not purport to offer such an ex-
haustive analysis of self-help in general but introduces the concept as a justification for inclu-
sion. 
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self-help, its use produces an immediate result that is certain. Such 
certainty does not exist in the judicial domain.161 
Additionally, self-help allows parties to protect their interests without 
judicial intervention162 and also provides greater options even where 
a self-help provision is used to terminate a contract.163 
Examples of the utilization of self-help already exist in Article 2 
but do not tend to provide an aggrieved party the benefits that self-
help procedures should provide. Professor Farnsworth divides self-
help into two categories: dispute-related and performance-related.164 
A buyer’s option to cover or a seller’s option to resell goods are ex-
amples of the dispute-related category.165 Examples of the perform-
ance-based category are suspending performance and demanding 
adequate assurance.166 The Nachfrist procedure, if included in the re-
vised Article 2, would certainly fall within the performance-based 
category. Professor Farnsworth comments that Nachfrist is an excep-
tion to the premise of constructive conditions of exchange in other 
performance-based procedures, namely suspending performance and 
demanding adequate assurance.167 The constructive conditions 
placed on a party facing a potential breach require that the party take 
the risk of becoming the party in breach if suspending performance is 
deemed wrongful.168 Creating uncertainty and placing an aggrieved 
party at risk can undermine the purpose of a self-help remedy and 
justify rethinking the available procedures to the aggrieved parties. 
The next section considers some problems raised by existing provi-
 
 161. Id. at 847 (footnotes omitted). Professor Taylor recognizes a number of additional 
benefits, such as reducing later evidentiary problems, allowing a cheaper alternative than resort-
ing to official action, and other subtle factors that “include psychological components of con-
trol and autonomy.” Id.  
 162. See id. at 849. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 153, § 8.19a. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. The constructive conditions of exchange were “given shape by Mansfield and 
[were given] style by Corbin.” Professor Farnsworth comments, 
The rationale for giving an aggrieved party the rights to suspend its own perform-
ance and to demand assurance of the other party’s performance is that the aggrieved 
party’s duties are constructively conditional on the other party’s doing what it is to 
do in the order determined by the contract. The availability of performance-related 
self-help is therefore closely tied to the order of the parties’ performances. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 168. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 903. 
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sions in Article 2 and considers how the Nachfrist procedure could 
provide a solution to these problems. 
B. The Incorporation Process: Rethinking Current Article 2 Provisions 
1. The standards for breach in Article 2 
a. The perfect tender rule. The procedure for suspending per-
formance and seeking adequate assurance of performance is just one 
area that may be reconsidered in determining how effective inclusion 
of the Nachfrist procedure would be in Article 2. As previously 
noted, the threshold for breach in a one-shot contract is the oft-
maligned perfect tender rule in section 2-601.169 In a sense, perfect 
tender may be considered a self-help remedy in itself, permitting a 
party to reject nonconforming goods without judicial intervention.170 
The Code binds the buyer to exercise good faith and commercial 
reasonableness171 but otherwise permits a party to take action for 
himself in the event of nonconformity in the goods or tender of de-
livery.172 
Under the perfect tender rule, if the parties stipulate a definite 
manner, time, and place for delivery in the contract—or particularly 
if the parties stipulate time is of the essence—nonconformity in the 
tender of the delivery will allow one party to reject a shipment and 
possibly terminate the contract.173 In this situation, the Nachfrist 
procedure would not provide substantial aid to a party facing a po-
tential breach. For example, if the parties stipulate delivery is due on 
July 1 and delivery is made on July 8, then section 2-601 permits the 
party receiving the goods to reject for failure of conformity of tender 
of delivery.174 The party facing potential breach need not be con-
cerned about whether a slight delay rises to the level of a fundamen-
 
 169. See supra Part III.A.2; UCC § 2-601. 
 170. According to the official comment, one of the purposes of adding the provisions in 
§ 2-601 was “[t]o make it clear that . . . [a] buyer accepting a non-conforming tender is not 
penalized by the loss of any remedy otherwise open to him.” UCC § 2-601 cmt. 1. 
 171. See id. 
 172. The Code’s comment indicates more concern with the effect of the buyer’s partial 
or full acceptance of goods than with the full rejection of the goods. See id. cmt. 2. 
 173. See UCC §§ 2-503(1); 2-601; 2-106(3). 
 174. See UCC § 2-601. To be sure, the party facing breach may invoke one of the exist-
ing self-help options before July 1, such as demanding adequate assurance. Moreover, under 
section 2-610, the party may await performance for a commercially reasonable time. 
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tal or material breach, since the perfect tender rule requires confor-
mity to the contract terms. This rather simplistic example admittedly 
ignores the commercial reality that a party who enters into an 
agreement likely does not seek termination for mere delay in delivery 
but does illustrate that the concern for determining whether the de-
lay is fundamental is absent under the perfect tender rule.175 
Applying Nachfrist may cast doubt on the need for the perfect 
tender rule but only if the drafters of the revised UCC include Nach-
frist wholesale. Even if one hypothesizes that the standard of breach 
should be more stringent than perfect tender (not ignoring section 
2-601’s application), it is not likely feasible to establish a new stan-
dard for breach not otherwise existing in contract law. The CISG’s 
threshold for fundamental breach is not founded on any existing na-
tional law,176 and it is doubtful whether it would even be introduced 
in the law governing the sale of goods when the common law 
threshold is material breach.177 Although the perfect tender rule al-
tered the standard for breach in traditional contract law (i.e., the ma-
terial breach standard), a workable set of standards remains to de-
termine breach: perfect tender in one-shot commercial transactions 
but material breach in situations outside the Code.178 This would not 
likely be true if the standard for breach in the Code were a “funda-
mental” breach while the traditional standard is “material” breach. 
b. “Substantial impairment” in installment contracts. Revisions to 
Article 2 provisions beyond the standard of breach will likely be 
more tenable, but Nachfrist may provide some level of certainty to 
another standard for breach in the Code—that of installment con-
 
 175. It is rather difficult to consider whether Nachfrist would be applicable in the two 
instances where a seller may cure nonconformity. See supra, notes 77-80 and accompanying 
text. Where the seller may cure before the time for delivery has expired, there exists little need 
for the buyer to affix additional time for delivery. See UCC § 2-508(1). Where the time for 
delivery has passed, the seller may—interestingly enough—be granted further additional time 
to cure if she had reasonable grounds to believe the nonconforming goods would be accept-
able. See UCC § 2-508(2). In either of these situations, it is clear that the buyer need not be 
concerned about whether his action to terminate (or bring action for damages) would itself be 
a breach. 
 176. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 904 and n.356. 
 177. However, as noted infra, Part IV.2.b, similarities exist between the fundamental 
breach threshold in the CISG and the threshold for breach of an installment contract under § 
2-612 of the Code. 
 178. This is particularly true when one considers that the doctrine of substantial perform-
ance would be of little use in facilitating the sale of goods, as compared to a service-related 
contract. 
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tracts.179 Under section 2-612(2), a buyer may reject any noncon-
forming installment “if the non-conformity substantially impairs the 
value of the installment and cannot be cured.”180 Under section 2-
612(3), a breach of the entire installment contract occurs when “one 
or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole 
contract.”181 The question of what constitutes “substantial impair-
ment” has usually been directed at subsection (3) of section 2-
612,182 but Nachfrist could provide a procedure that would clarify 
the provisions found in subsection (2) as well, especially the provi-
sion granting the seller an opportunity to cure. 
Comment 4 to section 2-612 states, 
[An] installment agreement may require accurate conformity in 
quality as a condition to the right to acceptance if the need for such 
conformity is made clear either by express provision or by the cir-
cumstances. In such a case the effect of the agreement is to define 
explicitly what amounts to substantial impairment of value impossi-
ble to cure. . . . Substantial impairment of the value of an install-
ment can turn not only on the quality of the goods but also on 
such factors as time, quantity, assortment, and the like. It must be 
judged in terms of the normal or specifically known purpose of the 
contract.183 
Under subsection (2), a buyer must accept an installment if the seller 
gives adequate assurances of cure.184 Comment 5 indicates that ade-
quate assurance in this section is measured by the same standards as 
 
 179. UCC § 2-612(1) defines “installment contract” as “one which requires or author-
izes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract 
contains a clause ‘each delivery is a separate contract’ or its equivalent.” See also UCC § 2A-
510 (determining breach of an installment lease). 
 180. UCC § 2-612(2). 
 181. UCC § 2-612(3). This section further states that “the aggrieved party reinstates the 
contract if he accepts a non-conforming installment without seasonably notifying of cancella-
tion or if he brings an action with respect only to past installments or demands performance as 
to future installments.” 
 182. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 8-3(b) (“To date, there is little case law 
under 2-612(2). The judicial activity has been under 2-612(3) where the standard does not 
‘substantially impair the value of that installment’ but ‘substantially impairs the value of the 
whole contract.’”). 
 183. UCC § 2-612 cmt. 4. 
 184. See UCC § 2-612(2). The text of subsection (2) and comment 4 seem to indicate 
that the cure is more focused on nonconformity in the quality of the goods, rather than on the 
timeliness of delivery. However, comment 4, quoted in the text above, also indicates that sub-
stantial impairment can turn on the time factor. See UCC § 2-612 cmt. 4. 
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under the right of adequate assurances of performance in section 2-
609.185 
Utilizing the Nachfrist procedure in lieu of (or as a supplement 
to) the adequate assurance provision in section 2-609 is discussed 
below,186 but the procedure could apply equally in section 2-612(2) 
as well, especially in the case of a delay in delivery. For example, if 
the seller is required to make a delivery in an installment contract on 
July 1, but the delivery is delayed, the buyer may reject the shipment 
only if the nonconformity in the tender substantially impairs the 
value of the installment. Under the current section 2-612, even if the 
nonconformity does result in a substantial impairment, the seller may 
give adequate assurance of cure and prevent the buyer from rejecting 
the installment. While this procedure facilitates the continuance of 
the contract, continuing delays in installment deliveries (which pre-
sumably do not substantially impair the value of the whole contract) 
may lead the buyer to want to reject a late installment, even if the 
seller can give assurances to cure. 
If the Nachfrist procedure were available, the buyer could set a 
date—July 15, for example—upon which the delivery must be made. 
The buyer would be unable to reject the installment until that date. 
But after July 15, the buyer could reject the installment without un-
due concern about whether the delay substantially impaired the in-
stallment or without waiting to give the seller an opportunity to 
cure. 
The provisions in subsection (3) of section 2-612 perhaps more 
clearly illustrate the effective use of Nachfrist, not only for a buyer in 
the case of delay of delivery but also for a seller in the case of non-
payment by the buyer.187 The “substantial impairment” doctrine is 
 
 185. See UCC § 2-612 cmt. 5. Comment 5 states,  
Under subsection (2) an installment delivery must be accepted if the non-
conformity is curable and the seller gives adequate assurance of cure. Cure of non-
conformity of an installment in the first instance can usually be afforded by an allow-
ance against the price, or in the case of reasonable discrepancies in quantity either by 
a further delivery or a partial rejection. 
 186. See infra Parts IV and V. A clear relationship exists between adequate assurance of 
performance and the provisions in 2-612(2) and (3). 
 187. The language of subsection (2) specifically indicates it is applicable as a buyer’s rem-
edy. See UCC § 2-612(2) (delineating between the buyer’s and seller’s duties). Subsection (3), 
on the other hand, does not delineate between buyer and seller but refers to the options of the 
“aggrieved party.” See UCC § 2-612(3). 
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closely related to the concept of “material breach.”188 Professors 
White and Summers observed, 
The basic test in the installment case under [section] 2-612(3) is 
that the goods be “substantially” nonconforming. The Code gives 
no guidelines to determine which performances are substantially 
nonconforming and which are only insubstantially so. The com-
mon law concept of “material breach” is at least a first cousin to the 
concept of “substantial nonconformity,” and it offers a fruitful 
analogy to one who seeks to determine whether the seller’s per-
formance substantially nonconforms.189 
Though fundamental breach under the CISG clearly was not derived 
from the UCC’s concept of substantial impairment, one cannot 
avoid the similitude.190 Similar to the rationale behind requiring fun-
damental breach in the Convention,191 “[s]ubsection (3) is designed 
to further the continuance of the contract in the absence of an overt 
cancellation.”192 
What amounts to substantial impairment of the value of the 
whole contract is typically a troublesome question to answer.193 In 
 
 188. See supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text. 
 189. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 8-3(b). 
 190. See supra Part III.3.b. 
 191. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 192. UCC § 2-612 cmt. 6.  
 193. Professors White and Summers, as well as Professors Calamari and Perillo, illustrate 
the difficulty of this question with the case of Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. White Lumber 
Sales, Inc., 474 P.2d 1 (Or. 1970). White and Summers summarize this case as follows: 
[T]here was an installment contract for the sale of twenty carloads of plywood. The 
first carload did not conform to the contract because nine percent of the plywood in 
the car deviated from the thickness specifications. The trade standard authorized de-
viations of five percent. The second and third carloads which arrived at buyer’s place 
of business after buyer had purportedly canceled the contract did conform. The 
court held that the deviation did not substantially impair the value of the whole con-
tract and found moreover that the non-conformity could be cured by an adjustment 
in the price. 
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 8-3(b); see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, at 
11-20(d). Professors White and Summers further illustrate the determination of substantial 
impairment with a pre-code case, Plotnick v. Pennsylvania Smelting & Refining Co., 194 F.2d 
859 (3d Cir. 1952). The judge in that case observed, 
First, non-payment for a delivered shipment may make it impossible or unreasonably 
burdensome from a financial point of view for the seller to supply future installments 
as promised. Second, buyer’s breach of his promise to pay for one installment may 
create such reasonable apprehension in the seller’s mind concerning payment for fu-
ture installments that the seller should not be required to take the risk involved in 
continuing deliveries. 
2DUN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:32 PM 
1363] Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally 
 1399 
the case of a delay in delivery, establishing substantial impairment of 
the whole contract based on this delay is difficult, even more so than 
establishing breach in one installment.194 A Nachfrist procedure 
could permit the buyer to fix additional time, after which the delay 
would be deemed to be substantial impairment of not only the in-
stallment but also of the whole contract. The case of nonpayment by 
a buyer presents similar problems in determining whether such non-
payment causes substantial impairment of the whole contract. A 
Nachfrist notice could require payment due on a particular date, 
with nonpayment by that date being considered substantial impair-
ment of the whole contract.195 
Though the Nachfrist procedure adopted by the CISG seems to 
adapt rather smoothly to the standard of breach in installment con-
tracts, a few other problem areas exist. One concern is that if the 
standard of breach for one-shot contracts remains the perfect tender 
rule adoption of Nachfrist would likely be available only to parties in 
an installment contract.196 This fact could easily defeat the purpose of 
including the Nachfrist provision, since the party would first have to 
ascertain whether the standard for breach were perfect tender or sub-
stantial impairment before utilizing Nachfrist as a self-help provi-
sion.197 
Another concern (and the topic of the next section) is whether 
Nachfrist can serve to supplement the already-existing self-help rem-
edy of adequate assurance of performance, or whether Nachfrist 
must necessarily replace the Code’s current provisions.198 
 
Id. at 862. 
 194. See THOMAS M. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW 
DIGEST 186 (1978). 
 195. Other problems incorporating Nachfrist would include the second sentence of sub-
section (3), which provides, “[T]he aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a non-
conforming installment without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he brings an action 
with respect only to past installments or demands performance of future installments.” UCC § 
2-612(3). 
 196. By comparison, the right of adequate assurance of performance in § 2-609 is more 
readily applicable to both one-shot contracts and to installment contracts. 
 197. Of course, this assumes it to be infeasible to utilize Nachfrist with the perfect tender 
rule. See supra Part IV.B.1.a. 
 198. Professor Taylor, for one, suggests that the Nachfrist procedure is superior as a self-
help remedy and should be adopted to broaden the availability of self-help procedures. Taylor, 
supra note 153, at 904; see also Schadbach, supra note 19, at 350 (suggesting Nachfrist would 
change the current UCC provisions for notice of termination and requests for adequate assur-
ances). Neither the notice of termination under § 2-309(3) nor the notice of cancellation in § 
2DUN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:32 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1400 
2. Right to adequate assurance of performance 
The benefits of including Nachfrist as a self-help procedure may 
suggest that it replace the right to adequate assurance of perform-
ance (under section 2-609) because Nachfrist accomplishes the 
Code’s objective of mitigating the effect of repudiation.199 Section 2-
609 contains some problematic language and “sometimes does little 
more than extend the minuet between the weaseling party and the 
contractual counterpart and add a couple of new moves.”200 Never-
theless, the Nachfrist procedure typically applies in a situation of de-
lay in performance and is probably not appropriate in all cases where 
a party has “reasonable grounds for insecurity.”201 The fact that the 
CISG contains both a Nachfrist procedure and a procedure for sus-
pending performance pending adequate assurance indicates that both 
procedures may coexist without undue interference in application 
with the other.202 As this section explains, adoption of the Nachfrist 
procedure should not mean exclusion of the procedure for adequate 
assurances under section 2-609. 
a. Problematic language in § 2-609. Section 2-609 introduced 
the concept of adequate assurances of performance into sales law to 
aid an aggrieved party where the other party displays serious prospec-
tive inability to perform or unwillingness to perform.203 Under sub-
section (1) of 2-609, 
A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the 
other’s expectation of receiving due performance will not be im-
paired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to 
the performance of either party the other may in writing demand 
adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such 
assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance 
for which he has not already received the agreed return.204 
 
 
 
2-612(3) would seem to prove problematic if Nachfrist were applied. Article 26 of the CISG 
requires notice to the defaulting party. 
 199. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 6-2.  
 200. Id. 
 201. UCC § 2-609. 
 202. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(3). 
 203. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 12-2. 
 204. UCC § 2-609(1). 
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The provision for adequate assurances has no common law coun-
terpart, although the Restatement Second contains a version of ade-
quate assurances.205 The first comment to section 2-609 explains, 
The section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential 
purpose of a contract between men is actual performance and they 
do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right 
to win a lawsuit and that a continuing sense of reliance and security 
that the promised performance will be forthcoming when due, is an 
important feature of the bargain. . . . Once [a party] has been given 
reason to believe that the buyer’s performance has become uncer-
tain, it is an undue hardship to force him to continue his own per-
formance. Similarly, a buyer who believes that the seller’s deliveries 
have become uncertain cannot safely wait for the due date of per-
formance when he has been buying to assure himself of materials 
for his current manufacturing or to replenish his stock of merchan-
dise.206 
The Code defines neither “adequate assurances” nor “reasonable 
grounds for insecurity,” with the comment indicating that commer-
cial reasonableness is a major factor.207 Three measures have been 
adopted by this section “to meet the needs of commercial men” in 
the situations covered by section 2-609.208 First, the aggrieved party 
may suspend performance, meaning she may “hold up performance 
pending the outcome of the demand, and includes also the holding 
up of any preparatory action.”209 Second, the aggrieved party may 
seek adequate assurances that the other party’s performance will be 
duly forthcoming.210 Finally, section 2-609 “provides the means by 
which the aggrieved party may treat the contact as broken if his  
 
 
 205. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 12-3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 251. 
 206. UCC § 2-609 cmt. 1. 
 207. See UCC § 2-609 cmt. 2; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 12-2; WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 6-2. Subsection (2) of 2-609 provides the standard between mer-
chants: “The reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance of-
fered shall be determined according to commercial standards.” UCC § 2-609. 
 208. UCC § 2-609 cmt. 2. 
 209. Id.; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 12-2. 
 210. See UCC § 2-609 cmt. 2; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 12-2. According 
to comment 2, “This principle is reflected in the familiar clauses permitting the seller to curtail 
deliveries if the buyer’s credit becomes impaired, which when held within the limits of reason-
ableness and good faith actually express no more than the fair business meaning of any com-
mercial contract.” UCC § 2-609 cmt. 2. 
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reasonable grounds for insecurity are not cleared up within a reason-
able time.”211 
In any case where one party is uncertain of the other party’s per-
formance, section 2-609 is a “powerful statutory incorporation of 
self-help.”212 Concern usually centers on the vague meaning of the 
terms.213 Action by one party might give rise to “reasonable grounds 
for insecurity” in one case, while it does not in another.214 One 
commentator suggests that “reasonable grounds” occur when “it is 
probable, but not certain, that performance will not be rendered.”215 
Where no reasonable grounds for insecurity exist, the party claiming 
 
 211. Id. Professors Calamari and Perillo comment, “[F]ailure to provide adequate assur-
ances may create an anticipatory repudiation and thus give rise to all of the remedies available 
for such a repudiation. In other words this section creates a new form of repudiation.” 
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 12-2 (footnotes omitted). 
 212. Taylor, supra note 153, at 883. Professor Taylor observes, 
When properly applied, it operates to the advantage of both parties and is an effi-
cient mechanism for preventing breach or minimizing total cost if breach is inevita-
ble. In the ideal situation, seeking adequate assurances helps the [party facing 
breach] in one of two ways. First, if the other party fails to provide adequate assur-
ances, the [party facing breach] has solid authority to terminate the contract. Absent 
the request and non-response, the [party facing breach] would have no justification 
to terminate unless the other party was already in total material breach, which . . . is 
often difficult to determine. If the other party does provide adequate assurance, the 
[interest of the party facing breach] in future performance is restored and it can con-
fidently carry on with the contract. Thus, section 2-609 approves self-help to reduce 
uncertainty to the [party facing breach] when the status of the contract is unclear. 
Id. at 883–84 (footnotes omitted). 
 213. See, e.g., id. at 883-87; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, § 12-2; WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 6-2. 
 214. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 6-2. (noting that the “trier of fact must 
normally answer whether grounds for insecurity exist”). 
 215. Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach—Common Law 
Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 
553, 589–90 (1976); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 6-2; Taylor, supra note 
154, at 886. Professors White and Summers include such illustrations for grounds of insecurity 
as the following: 
[A] seller that stops producing the machines to be delivered under the contract; 
goods like those contracted for but delivered to other buyers fail to work as antici-
pated; seller of a boat defaults on a mortgage thereby creating a cloud on the title; 
seller fails to deliver goods on schedule and prompt delivery is essential; and, where 
the seller states that the contract price is too low to guarantee performance. 
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 6-2, (citing Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer’s Gas 
Co., 870 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1989); Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 
730 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1984); AMF, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 536 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 
1976); Creusot-Loire Int’l, Inc. v. Coppus Eng’g Corp. 585 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 
Universal Builders Corp. v. United Methodist Convalescent Homes, Inc., 508 A.2d 819 
(Conn. App. 1986)). 
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such grounds may not receive adequate assurances.216 Where reason-
able grounds for insecurity do exist, what action by the other party 
constitutes “adequate assurance” is another question not easily ascer-
tainable without reference to a particular set of facts.217 Moreover, a 
party who might have reasonable grounds for insecurity must pro-
ceed with caution because the action of suspending his own per-
formance may itself constitute breach.218 
The party uncertain about whether reasonable grounds for inse-
curity exist may not wish to proceed and may be unable to mitigate 
damages caused by an eventual breach. A minor delay in delivery (or 
in payment, in the case of a seller) could easily present this problem 
if one party indicates to the aggrieved party that performance may be 
delayed for a short time.219 Although nothing in section 2-609 re-
quires the aggrieved party to suspend performance, receiving ade-
quate assurance may not provide sufficient certainty concerning the 
time for delivery when a delay in performance seems forthcoming. 
Where the perfect tender rule applies, if the other party does not per-
form by the date of performance,220 the aggrieved party may termi-
nate based on the breach if this suits the aggrieved party’s need. 
However, in an installment contract, the delay must substantially im-
pair either the value of the installment or the whole contract for the 
party to reject the eventual performance.221 
 
 
 216. See Cole v. Melvin, 441 F. Supp. 193, 203 (D.S.D. 1977); In re Coast Trading Co., 
26 B.R. 737 (D. Or. 1982); Turntables, Inc. v. Gestetner, 52 A.D. 2d 776, N.Y. Supp. 2d 798 
(1976); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 6-2. 
 217. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 6-2. 
 218. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 884. Taylor explains, 
Although section 2-609 has many benefits, it is not a perfect self-help remedy. It is a 
high-risk decision for a [party facing breach] to elect to seek assurances with the po-
tential for serious consequences if the decision to do so was not justified. . . . If a 
[party facing breach] seeks assurances and suspends performance when not author-
ized to do so, its suspension may cause it to be in total material breach and liable to 
the other party. Therefore, it is necessary to consider when the right to seek assur-
ances arises. 
Id.; see also Matthew C. Brenneman, Annotation, Sales: What Constitutes “Reasonable Grounds 
for Insecurity” Justifying Demand for Adequate Assurance of Performance Under UCC § 2-609, 
37 A.L.R.5th 459 (1996). 
 219. See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text. 
 220. This would be determined either by the contract, or by a gap-filling provision, such 
as UCC § 2-309. 
 221. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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b. Interplay between § 2-609 and § 2-612. As noted above,222 a 
considerable amount of interplay exists between the provision grant-
ing the right to seek adequate assurance in section 2-609 and provi-
sions found in section 2-612 dealing with installment contracts. Un-
der section 2-612(2), even if a nonconforming delivery substantially 
impairs the value of the installment, the buyer may not reject the in-
stallment if the seller gives adequate assurances to cure.223 Subsection 
(3), which determines when a breach of a whole installment contract 
occurs, does not contain this provision, but case law suggests a clear 
relationship between the provisions for demanding adequate assur-
ance in section 2-609 and the provisions for determining breach of 
the whole contract under section 2-612(3).224 An analysis of these 
cases indicates that the demand for adequate assurances may be help-
ful in determining whether nonperformance by one party substan-
tially impairs the value of the installment contract, much like fixing 
additional time may be a prerequisite for determining fundamental 
breach under the CISG.225 
In Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. Snydergeneral Corp.,226 no sub-
stantial impairment of an installment contract occurred when a buyer 
failed to pay for an installment of goods within 30 days of delivery, 
as required by the contract.227 The contract provided that payment of 
a delivery was to be made within 30 days of delivery but that the 
course of performance between the parties indicated that payment 
was made consistently 90 days after shipment.228 The court held that 
the seller waived the 30-day payment provision through its course of 
performance;229 even if it did not, the seller would have been justified 
in withholding future delivery and bringing suit only if the buyer’s 
failure to pay the installments were a substantial impairment to the 
whole contract.230 With regard to the latter action, the court indi-
cated the buyer’s “failure to pay on thirty day terms would not con-
 
 222. See supra notes 192–208 and accompanying text. 
 223. See UCC § 2-612(2). 
 224. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 8-3 n.12. 
 225. See infra Part V. 
 226. 944 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 227. See id. at 1147–48. 
 228. In fact, only once did Cassidy, the buyer, make payment during the 30-day window. 
Id. at 1147. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. at 1148. 
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stitute a substantial impairment of the contract unless [the seller] ex-
ercised its right to seek adequate assurance of payment.”231 Since the 
seller did not demand adequate assurances of performance, the effect 
was that the seller’s withholding of delivery amounted to a breach, 
even though the buyer was in arrearages in payment on the contract. 
A buyer who was behind in installment payments also prevailed 
in Hudson Feather & Down Products, Inc. v. Lancer Clothing Corp.232 
In this case, the buyer failed to make payment under the first two in-
stallments due under the contract, but the court found that the fail-
ure of payment did not result in substantial impairment of the whole 
contract under section 2-612(3).233 Rather, the seller repudiated and 
did not respond to the buyer’s demand for adequate assurance of 
performance. The buyer was therefore entitled to cease performance 
and cancel the contract, per section 2-711(1).234 
The seller did prevail in Cherwell-Ralli, Inc. v. Rytman Grain 
Co.,235 where the court rejected the claim of the buyer, who had 
stopped payment on a check for an installment payment, which the 
seller breached by failing to provide adequate assurance.236 The 
buyer, behind on payments, agreed to make arrearages when the 
seller assured the buyer that deliveries would continue.237 After the 
buyer sent the check, a deliverer for the seller gave the buyer the in-
dication that the seller would cease delivery. The buyer stopped 
payment on the check then demanded adequate assurance for future 
deliveries. The court flatly rejected a reasonable grounds for insecu-
rity, noting that “[t]he buyer could not rely on its own nonpayments 
as a basis for its own insecurity.”238 The court also suggested, 
If there is reasonable doubt about whether the buyer’s default is 
substantial, the seller may be well advised to temporize by suspend-
ing further performance until it can ascertain whether the buyer is 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. 513 A.D.2d 674, 513 N.Y. Supp. 2d 173 (1987). 
 233. See id. at 675. The court commented that, by bringing an action only with respect 
to past installment payments, the seller indicated it wished to keep the contract intact, even if 
there was substantial impairment by the buyer. 
 234. See id. 
 235. 433 A.2d 984 (Conn. 1980). 
 236. See id. at 985–87. 
 237. See id. at 985. The buyer was apparently concerned that the seller’s plant was going 
to close, which was one reason for the nonpayment. However, the facts also indicate that the 
buyer had missed payments almost immediately after the contract had been consummated. Id. 
 238. Id. at 987. 
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able to offer adequate assurance of future payments. But if the 
buyer’s conduct is sufficiently egregious, such conduct will, in and 
of itself, constitute substantial impairment of the value of the whole 
contract and a present breach of the contract as a whole.239 
In each of these cases, the buyer’s nonpayment almost unques-
tionably gives rise to reasonable grounds for insecurity, but none of 
these cases suggests that mere nonpayment, without more, is a sub-
stantial impairment of the whole contract. The Cherwell-Ralli court 
suggested that the seller suspend his own performance and seek ade-
quate assurances, but the risk that suspension may result in breach is 
indicated by the Cassidy Powell Lynch case. Though the controlling 
facts to some degree indicate a failure on the part of a party to utilize 
the self-help provisions in both sections 2-609 and 2-612, these 
cases also illustrate the uncertainty in using these provisions. 
Applying the Nachfrist procedure to these cases, the seller’s op-
tion in the event of nonpayment could be to affix an additional 
amount of time for payment while continuing performance until 
such time arrives.240 This substantially increases the level of certainty 
in the actions of the parties while also substantially lessening the level 
of risk to the party facing potential breach. As the next section sug-
gests, however, rethinking current self-help provisions, especially the 
right to adequate assurance of performance, does not require elimi-
nating existing provisions to accommodate the Nachfrist provision. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR INCLUSION OF A NACHFRIST PROVISION IN 
THE UCC 
Providing a mechanism to permit a party to fix additional time to 
determine for certain whether the threshold for breach has been met 
does not seem, on the surface, like such an intricate endeavor. A 
more careful consideration is required, however, to assure that Nach-
frist would be included in a manner that would allow the procedure 
to facilitate continuance of contracts rather than as a mechanism 
fraught with uncertain application. With the provisions in the CISG  
 
 
 239. Id. at 987 (citations omitted); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 8-3. 
 240. This would occur by using the Nachfrist provision for sellers similar to Article 63 of 
the CISG, for example. Though each of the cases analyzed in this section dealt with a buyer’s 
delay in payment, the same problem could easily exist where a seller delayed shipment of the 
goods. 
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as guidance, this section suggests how the Code could be revised to 
include Nachfrist without substantial alteration of existing elements. 
A. Raising the Threshold for Breach 
A starting point for revision to permit successful inclusion of 
Nachfrist is elimination of the perfect tender rule in section 2-601. 
Though a powerful tool for a party facing a potential breach,241 the 
restrictions placed upon its application should indicate that elevating 
the threshold for breach would prove difficult in terms of neither the 
structure of the Code nor the practical application of the code in 
general.242 Professors White and Summers 
conclude, and the cases decided to date suggest, that the Code 
changes and the courts’ manipulation have so eroded the perfect 
tender rule that the law would be little changed if 2-601 gave the 
right to reject only upon “substantial” non-conformity. Of the re-
ported Code cases on rejection, none that we have found actually 
grants rejection on what could fairly be called an insubstantial non-
conformity, despite language in some cases allowing such rejec-
tion.243 
Adoption of the threshold for breach in installment contracts—
that of permitting cancellation of a contract only if a nonconformity 
substantially impairs the value of the contract—would closely parallel 
the threshold of fundamental breach in the CISG.244 Even in a one-
shot contract, a prospective delay in performance may not allow one 
party to cancel the contract if the delay does not substantially impair 
the value of the contract. Rather than rely solely on suspending per-
formance and demanding adequate assurance, the party facing the 
delay could affix the additional time. Similar to the CISG and the 
UNIDROIT Principles, there seems no reason to differentiate be-
tween the application of this extension of time between buyers and 
sellers.245 
 
 241. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 868. 
 242. Examples of restrictions on the application of section 2-601 include the provisions 
in installment contracts under section 2-612, requiring material delay or loss as grounds for 
rejection in an improper shipment in section 2-504, and in the more general restrictions of 
good faith, trade usage, course of dealing or course of performance. See WHITE & SUMMERS, 
supra note 75, § 8-3(b).  
 243. Id. 
 244. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 245. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 47, 63. 
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Elevating the threshold for breach is the easy solution to incor-
poration. Having suggested elimination of the perfect tender rule, 
Professors White and Summers also recognize that most of the ef-
forts of revision would retain this rule.246 As retention is likely the 
case, inclusion of a Nachfrist procedure should revolve around the 
procedure’s application in installment contracts. Though Nachfrist 
could be convenient in the case of a one-shot contract, its application 
would clearly be more effective where the threshold for breach is 
more uncertain. In the cases discussed above,247 where a party has 
delayed in performance on the installment but the other party is un-
certain whether reasonable grounds for insecurity exist, or whether 
suspending performance is proper, Nachfrist would provide a greater 
level of certainty for the aggrieved party. Moreover, a procedure for 
affixing additional time could also replace the provision in section 2-
612(2) forbidding an aggrieved party from rejecting a single install-
ment when the other give adequate assurances of cure.248 Though 
Nachfrist should be available to facilitate all sales of goods, it should 
at least be available where the Code already requires substantial im-
pairment to cancel the contract. 
B. Adopting Cooperative Provisions for Nachfrist and Adequate 
Assurance of Performance 
Though a provision for fixing additional time might be more ap-
propriate in circumstances involving delay than seeking adequate as-
surance after suspending performance, in some—or many—
situations, the conduct of one party may be sufficiently egregious to 
warrant the other party’s suspension of performance. The CISG con-
tains distinct provisions permitting either a Nachfrist notice and con-
tinued performance or, where the conduct of a party indicates “he 
will not perform a substantial part of his obligations,” suspension of 
 
 246. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 8-3. 
In the face of this campaign against perfect tender, both the Article 2 Study Com-
mittee and the current proposals of the Article 2 Revision Committee would retain 
the perfect tender rule. Particularly consumer representatives on those committees 
have argued for its retention. Are consumers asking for the right to return the dress 
with a single stitch out of place because they have found the same dress elsewhere at 
a lower price? For shame. 
Id. § 8-3(b). Though this comment was in the 1995 edition, no research by this author has 
indicated that the proposals of the current Article 2 would eliminate the perfect tender rule. 
 247. See supra Part IV.B.2.b. 
 248. See UCC § 2-612(2). 
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performance.249 The existence of these provisions in the Convention 
should indicate there is no reason to exclude the current section 2-
609 should Nachfrist be included in the revised Code. 
This should not indicate that section 2-609 should remain intact 
as it currently exists. Section 2-609 of the Code and Article 71(3) of 
the Convention contain parallels, but this parallelism is, in part, an 
illusion.250 Where a party may suspend performance under section 
71(1), the party “must immediately give notice of the suspension to 
the other party and must continue with performance if the other 
party provides adequate assurance of his performance.”251 Unlike 
subsection (4) of 2-609 of the Code, Article 71(3) does not permit 
the aggrieved party to treat a failure to provide adequate assurances 
as a repudiation of the contract.252 Rather, section 71(3) requires the 
party who received adequate assurance to continue with perform-
ance.253 Where adequate assurances are not received, it more likely 
indicates that a fundamental breach has occurred, and the party who 
sought adequate assurance may proceed to avoid the contract under 
Article 72.254 
The interplay between the present section 2-609 and a provision 
for fixing additional time would hinge on the standard of breach 
adopted in the revised Article 2. If substantial impairment were 
adopted for all contracts governed by Article 2, the interplay would 
not be substantially different from that in the CISG. Section 2-609 
would still require reasonable grounds for insecurity as a requisite for 
suspending performance and seeking adequate assurance. However, 
the provision in subsection (4) recognizing repudiation for failure to  
 
 
 249. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 47, 63, 71(3). 
 250. See Flechtner, supra note 25, at 54. 
 251. CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(3). 
 252. See id. 
 253. See Secretariat of the United Nations, Secretariat Commentary on Article 62 of the 
1978 Draft [draft counterpart to CISG Article 71] (visited Nov. 18, 2000) <http:// 
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-71.html>. 
[The party receiving notice of suspension] can reinstate the first party’s obligation to 
continue performance by giving the first party adequate assurance that he will per-
form. For such an assurance to be ‘adequate,’ it must be such as will give reasonable 
security to the first party either that the other party will perform in fact, or that the 
first party will be compensated for all his losses from going forward with his own 
performances. 
Id.  
 254. See Flechtner, supra note 25. 
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provide adequate assurance might be revised to recognize that such a 
failure results in a substantial impairment of the contract. 
More troublesome considerations occur if the standard of breach 
remains the same as it exists in the current version of the Code, as 
indicated in the preceding section.255 A suggestion permitting the in-
clusion of a Nachfrist procedure would be to include such a proce-
dure in the provisions found in the current section 2-612. The right 
to adequate assurances would remain essentially intact, applying to 
any contract, while the Nachfrist procedure would help clear up un-
certainty with respect to the conduct of the parties in an installment 
contract. While this suggestion is not the ideal solution to inclu-
sion—especially since this author encourages adoption of a higher 
threshold of breach—it does provide to parties in many situations an 
additional and powerful option when facing a potential breach. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An overriding dilemma in seeking to implant a foreign concept 
into domestic law is the substantial difference in policy between the 
Convention and the UCC. The suggestions of raising the threshold 
for breach and providing procedures to aid parties resolve differences 
stem largely from a body of law that seeks to keep contracts intact. 
One might conclude that the UCC seeks not only to facilitate the 
sale of goods but also seeks to facilitate its breach. This conclusion is, 
of course, erroneous. But a suggestion on adopting a policy seeking 
to maintain contractual relationship at least deserves mention. Sev-
eral of the sections mentioned in this Article, particularly those deal-
ing with installment contracts and the right to demand adequate as-
surance, effectuate a goal of furthering continuance of a contact.256 
The CISG offers opportunities to examine a piece of domestic 
law—though limited in application—to see how other relevant laws 
can be made better. Practitioners should at least take care to know 
the contents of the Convention. Rather than routinely opting out of 
the Convention for reasons of evading its provisions, practitioners 
should become aware of when it could be effective to facilitate the 
goal of the contract. In the case of the Nachfrist provisions in Arti-
cles 47 and 63, a practitioner should not only be aware of these pro-
visions but should strive to understand their mechanics. A greater 
 
 255. See supra Part V.A. 
 256. See, e.g., UCC § 2-612, cmt. 6. 
2DUN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:32 PM 
1363] Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally 
 1411 
use of this provision in contracts involving domestic companies could 
easily justify its eventual inclusion into Article 2. 
The drafters of the revised Article 2 should also appreciate the 
opportunity the CISG provides in the design of a revised domestic 
sales law. Unlike drafting uniform text from scratch, the drafters can 
directly compare and contrast existing UCC provisions with existing 
and readily attainable provisions in a related sales law to see how the 
former could be improved. The Nachfrist provisions are a clear ex-
ample of an existing piece of the Convention that should be utilized 
in the revised version. Consideration of the Nachfrist provisions 
should also lead the drafters to consider the CISG on a larger scale, 
recognizing that the policy of keeping contracts intact is beneficial to 
commercial exchange. In sum, the CISG permits the drafters of the 
Code to examine closely revisions to the existing sales law without 
requiring them to forsake other alternatives. 
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